

MORAL MAN

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THE ANALYSIS OF MORAL MAN

An Outline of the Conditions of Human
Righteousness

BY

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"The Ridiculous and the Sublime," etc., etc.*



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Moral Science is, the systematic application
of the ultimate Rule of right to all concep-
tions of moral conduct.

The Analysis of Moral Man



SOURCES OF MORAL KNOWLEDGE.

1. Not in Sensation.

Sensation is neither an act, nor the knowledge of an act, but an involuntary experience consequent on personal relation to a sensitive organism, and to objects capable of making impressions on that organism.

2. Not in Perception.

Perception being a simple recognition of fact, can include only such facts as are capable of being known by simple observation, that is, without comparison and inference.

3. Not in Judgment.

The knowledge of an action as fact is one thing, the knowledge of that action as right or wrong is another thing. The former involves simple perception, the latter is attained only by comparison.

4. The Province of Reason.

Reason discovers the moral law, without explaining how this discovery has been provided for or on what ultimate basis the law rests.

5. The Moral Standard.

History reveals an irregular development of the moral code, largely due to racial and climatic conditions, but due also to the subjective character of the moral sense. What was right to the Asiatic barbarian was wrong to the Greek. What was right to the slave was wrong to the philosopher. The ethics of the middle ages seem faulty to the modern mind.

STEPS IN KNOWLEDGE.

1. Perception is the first state or affection of the human mind. By this we gain all our knowledge of the powers and qualities of the material objects about us. The instruments of perception are the five corporeal senses, seeing, feeling, hearing, tasting, and smelling.

2. Consciousness, or reflection, is that

notice, which the mind takes of its own operations, and modes of existence.

3. Abstraction literally implies the separating of one thing from another; but, as a mental operation, it denotes only a partial consideration of anything. It is the act of considering one or more of the properties or circumstances of an object, apart from the rest.

4. Attention expresses the immediate direction of the mind to a subject. The distinctness of our notions, the correctness of our judgments, and the improvement of all our intellectual powers, depend, in a great degree, on the habitual exercise of this act.

5. Definitions are usually distinguished into two kinds; one nominal, or of the name; the other real, or of the thing. A definition of the name is merely a specification of the object, to which a name is applied. A definition of the thing is properly an analysis of a thing, or an enumeration of its principal attributes.

6. Analysis deserves a place among the operations, by which the elements of knowledge are acquired. Without this, our perceptive powers would give us only confused and imperfect notions of the objects around us. To

analyze is nothing more, than to distinguish successively the several parts of any compound subject.

Reasoning.

1. Thorough information.
2. Systematic demonstration.
3. Logical adaptation.

Reasoning is a process, by which unknown truths are inferred from those, which are already known or admitted. The evidence, employed in reasoning, is deductive, and is distinguished into two kinds, which are, moral and demonstrative. Moral evidence is that species of proof, which is employed on subjects, directly or indirectly connected with moral conduct. It is not however confined to such subjects; but is extended to all those facts and events, concerning which we do not obtain the evidence of sense, intuition, or demonstration; and to all the general truths, which are deduced from observation and experience. Demonstrative evidence is that, by which we trace the relations, subsisting among things, in their nature immutable, like the subjects of geometry and arithmetic.

2. Judgment is an act of the mind, uniting

or separating two objects of thought according as they are perceived to agree or disagree. The relation between these objects is sometimes discovered by barely contemplating them, without reference to anything else; and sometimes by comparing them with other objects to which they have a known relation. The former is simple comparison; the latter is an act of reasoning. The determination of the mind in both cases is denominated judgment. Every act of judgment is grounded on some sort of evidence. That, which determines the mind in simple comparison, is called intuitive evidence; and that, which is employed in reasoning deductive.

External Conditions.

1. Observation.
2. Attention.

Attention expresses the state of the mind, when it is steadily directed, for some time, whether longer or shorter, to some object of sense or intellect, exclusive of other objects. When we say, that any external object, or any subject of thought, which is purely internal, receives attention, it seems to be the fact, as far as we are able to determine, that the mind

is occupied with the subject of its attention, whatever it is, for a certain period, and that all other things are, for the time being, shut out. In other words, the grasp, which the mind fixes upon the object of its contemplations, is an undivided, an unbroken one.

Internal Conditions.

1. Memory.

Reproduction.

Recognition.

Memory is that power or susceptibility of the mind, from which arise those conceptions, which are modified by the relation of past time. It is not a simple, but complex state of the intellectual principle, implying, (1) a conception of the object, (2) the relation of priority in its existence. That is, we not only have a conception of the object, but this conception is attended with the conviction, that it underwent the examination of our senses, or was perceived by us at some former period.

Memory.

When good—

1. Facility in receiving ideas.
2. Power of retaining ideas.
3. Readiness in reproducing.

Advantages—

1. Furnishes comparison of ideas, the basis of judgment.
2. Susceptibility to remembrances is intellectual and moral.

Means of Improving—

1. Selection of lines of intentional memory.
2. Correlation of ideas.
3. Systematize and refer to general principles.
4. Undivided attention.
5. Thorough understanding.
6. Congenial and serviceable exercise.
7. Use accessories to thorough conception and comprehension.

Means of improving the memory—

1. Discrimination for the interesting and the useful.
2. Knowledge classified.
3. Full acquaintance and understanding.
4. Exercised on useful subjects.
5. Explanatory accessories associated.
6. Writing useful in bringing the subject closer to the attention.
7. Occasional mnemonics.

The general principles or law of associa-

tion, which are sometimes called the primary laws, are these, resemblance, contrast, contiguity in time and place, and cause and effect.—The secondary laws of association, which give such great variety to the results of the primary principles, are these;—(1) Differences in the length of time of the Co-existence of the associated feelings at first;—(2) Their greater or less degree of liveliness;—(3) The frequency of their renewal;—(4) The circumstances of their being more or less recent;—(5) The degree or extent of their co-existence with other feelings;—(6) Diversities in temper and disposition;—(7) The influence of particular professions and pursuits;—(8) Certain constitutional differences in mental character.

Ideas.

Locke, having reference to the mode, in which our simple ideas are received into the mind, has divided them into the four following classes;

- (1) Those, which are received by one sense merely;
- (2) Those, which are received from more than one sense;

- (3) Those, which are received from reflection or the observation of what takes place in our minds;
- (4) Those, which are received by reflection, and come into the mind also at other times, in various ways, by the senses; or which in some instances are received by sensation and reflection combined, and not separately, as in some occasions of the origin of the simple idea of power.

Facts may be classified—

- (1). Original.

Sensation.

Consciousness.

Self-abilities.

- (2) General.

Self-existence.

Conscious identity.

Self-active abilities.

Reasonable discriminations.

Fact, kinds necessary—

As two and two are four.

Contingent.

The world exists.

Facts in the mind—

Elemental—activity, intelligence, liberty.

Universal—Being, diversity, identity, resemblance.

Causal—Cause and effect, motion, number, period of time.

Substance and quality—

Vitality.

Personality.

Objectivity—Whole and part, measure, space impenetrability.

Aesthetical—Truth, sublimity, beauty, deformity, ludicrousness.

Ethical—Conscience discerns moral differences, sense of obligation, reasonable duty.

THE WILL. (THE FACULTY OF RESOLUTION.)

Volition is the origin of activity only in so far as actions are regulated by our intellectual powers. It is only the intelligent being which can contemplate, devise, and execute a form of activity purely subjective in its source. What we originate is achieved, in respect of

plan, by means of thought ; in respect of force, by means of will. Only such action as owes its form to intellectual as well as volitional power is properly named Self-originated.

It starts, fixes, concentrates, clears and regulates the mind.

It gives to self-determination a positive selection and a spontaneous action.

It directs—

1. To a definite object.
2. To an alternate object.
3. To the fulfilling of inner desire.

It proceeds—

1. By pre-volitional cognition.
2. Emotion.
3. Conscious responsibility.

It has power—

1. To resist constitutional nature.
2. To use the means of environment.
3. To shape self according to the judgment.

Action is not free but the normal origin of action is free.

Differences Between Knowing and Feeling.

Feeling is a modification of self, knowing necessitates an outward impression.

Feeling is pleasure or pain, knowing is true or false.

Feelings are—

1. Fugitive.
2. Variable.
3. Intricate.

Knowing is—

1. Permanent.
2. Invariable.
3. Uniform.

Intellect is strengthened and feeling weakened by familiarity and repetition.

Cognitions may be recalled, feeling can not.

Intellect can entertain opposite propositions at once, feeling can not experience pain and joy at once.

Mind.

Subjective—conceptions.

Resolves into judgments.

Objective—perceptions.

Takes cognizance of externals, thus harvesting ideas.

Responsible.

Individual causation is proven by the attributes and functions of the intellect, sensibilities and will.

The conceptions of causality are in desires, duties, and reasons.

This causality influences the conceptions.

It may be classified into simple succession and its causes may be qualified as, mechanical, physical, vital, spontaneous.

The ground for certainties in causalities are—

The negative ones of chance and fate.

The positive necessities.

1. Individual.
2. Absolute.
3. Physical.
4. Hypothetical.

The possible and attainable.

The criterion of right and wrong as to feeling is—

1. Pleasure.
2. Pain.

As to reason is—

1. Usefulness.
2. Detriment.

As to will—

1. The possible.
2. The impossible.

As to the ideal—

1. Personal perfection.
2. Universal well-being.

The responsible agent—

As a personal agent, the individual is created an embodied self-active spirit.

1. He has motives.
For good.
For gain.
For revenge.
2. He is an arbiter and executor by choice and volition.
3. His guides are—
Prudence.
Conscience.
Rational ideal.
4. His moral nature is conscious and constructive.

As a moral agent, the theorists classify themselves as—experimentalists, intuitionists.

The requisites of responsibility are—intelligence, conscience, free-will.

Duty is a responsibility that is ethically necessary. Morality consists in deliberate self-submission to that necessity. Education in

moral life to the establishment of character is the most responsible of duties.

Free agency recognizes—

Free exercise in full maturity of mind.

Mental health.

Freedom from habit.

Free from the necessity of conditions or circumstance.

Unbiased action within the limits of mind.

Man exhibits his spirituality in—

Cognizing.

Volitionizing.

Feeling.

Hopefulness for immortality.

The general facts of responsibility are—

Man exists in relationships responsible according to his ability to know and to do.

Through these relationships, the mind desires to achieve certain results.

The dispositions of these desires may vary but the moral obligations due the relationships are invariable.

The belief in the indestructibility and evolution of mind.

Ideals relating to perfection and happiness.

The determination of rules and means to attain ideals.

These ideals are constructed in—

1. Egoism or self-love; that is the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain, pleasure being valued according to its pleasantness.

The impracticability of the egoistic ideal is shown in—

Transient pleasures cannot satisfy.

The analysis and comparison of pleasures necessary to a choice is unfavorable to pleasure.

Error in judging pleasures defeat their aim.

2. Intuitionism, the ability to see without education the conduct that is right and best.
3. Education, a careful and balanced training of all the faculties to a just appreciation of the beautiful, the true and good, duty to be discovered by reason.

Individual Education.

Rights of the child—

1. To be well born.
2. To be well protected.

3. To be under wholesome influence, example and precept.
4. To be well reared.
Physically
Mentally.
Socially.
Morally.

Responsibility of the child—

1. To the extent of its memory, understanding, and capability.
2. To the extent of its experience and reflective faculties.
3. To the extent of the wisdom inculcated by trusted advisers.

Fundamentals of its training—

1. It must be taught—
Obedience to authority.
Self-discipline.
Care of health.
Senses alert.
Wholesome thinking.
Righteous conduct.
Correct expression.
Inspiration for progress in moral excellence and usefulness.
2. Its temperament must be understood.

- Excitable or calm.
Energetic or dull.
3. Its disposition must be understood.
Sensitive or indifferent.
Careful or careless.
Hopeful or sad.
Sympathetic or unsympathetic.
Kind or unkind.
Leader or follower.
Arrogant or respectful.
Honest or dishonest.
4. Is its perception.
Quick or slow.
Accurate or inaccurate.
5. Is its memory of words
 (1.) Quick or slow.
 (2) Clear or confused.
Of ideas.
 (1) Distinct or indistinct.
 (2) Orderly or disorderly.
6. Is its imagination
Strong or weak.
Receptive or creative.
Intellectual or emotional.
Logical or illogical.
7. Is its attention

Strong or weak.

Voluntary or non-voluntary.

8. Is its understanding

Quick or slow.

Permanent or fleeting.

Independent or fleeting.

9. Is its language.

Broad or narrow.

Exact or inexact.

Plain or figurative.

10. Is its will

Weak or aggressive.

Yielding or obstinate.

Fluctuating or firm.

Practical understanding is the surest means to wise conduct. "Give me an understanding heart" is the most ethical prayer children can be taught to utter.

The child should never feel the need of resort to excuses, equivocations, and prevarications.

Children should be advised not censured whatever their failures if it is evident they have done the best they were able to know and to do.

The child as a pupil has the right to the best individual constructive training.

1. Under conditions of—

Bodily comfort.

Favorable surroundings.

At regular times.

With sufficient variety to prevent weariness and monotony.

2. Through practical means—

For mental discipline.

To become expert and efficient.

To gain useful information.

To attain the art and wisdom of successful conduct.

3. By incentives to study, as in—

Gratification of conscience.

Desire for self-development.

(1.) In well-regulated emulation.

(2.) Curiosity.

(3.) Love of approbation.

(4.) To gain honorable position.

(5.) To become an esteemed citizen.

(6.) To fulfill the desire for knowledge.

(7.) For moral culture.

(8.) Worthy aspiration.

(9.) To secure success in life.

4. By the 'development of character in
The desire to learn.
To have self-reliance.
Perseverance.
'Attention.
'Accuracy.
Patience.
Inspiring ideals.
5. By such government as makes clear his
duty—
To himself.
To his schoolmates.
To school property.
To tasks assigned.
To the teacher, school officers, visitors,
the community, and the people at
large.

The pupil should be taught to learn—

1. By trying to be interested.
2. By striving to comprehend.
3. By reflecting in order to remember.
4. By giving close attention.
5. By studying systematically.
6. By using his knowledge profitably.
7. By original investigation and thought.

He should be enabled to realize the folly of—

1. Offenses against himself, as—
 - Injuring his own property.
 - Losing friendship by rudeness or disagreeable manners.
 - Neglecting duties.
 - Uncleanliness.
 - Bad habits.
 - Immorality.
2. Offenses against companions, as—
 - Destroying their property.
 - Annoying and injuring them.
 - Accusing falsely.
 - Slandering.
 - Enticing to wrong.
3. Offenses against property, as—
 - Destruction by carelessness.
 - Wilful injury.
 - Aiding and abetting injury.
4. Offenses against teachers.
 - Disobedience.
 - Disrespect.
 - Annoyance.
 - Slandering.
 - Deceit.
 - Conspiracy.
5. Offenses against the school.

Restlessness.

Inattention.

Laughter.

Evil speaking.

Insubordination.

Neglect of study.

Irregular attendance.

Irreverence.

Distrustfulness.

Stubbornness.

6. Offenses against society.

Disturbing the peace.

Trespassing.

Boisterousness.

Recklessness.

Injurious influence.

Profanity.

Vulgarity.

Neglect of the opportunities of life.

Study is necessary for self-improvement—

1. Mentally.

2. Morally.

3. Socially.

4. Professionally.

Study should be pursued with method and system toward a given aim.

Among the benefits of study are that it—

1. Awakens thought.
2. Arouses the affections.
3. Excites interest.
4. Makes firm and resolute the understanding and will.
5. Promotes beneficial pleasure.
6. Defends virtue.
7. Disciplines and develops the natural powers.
8. Enlarges and liberates the mind.
9. Civilizes the emotions.
10. Makes labor and life pleasurable and profitable.

Discursive study should be avoided since it—

1. Debilitates the mind.
2. Makes opinion inaccurate and uncertain.
3. Weakens impressions.
4. Renders knowledge unwieldly.

Sedulousness in study includes—

1. Attention.
2. Constancy.
3. Firmness.
4. Discipline.
5. Composure.
6. Success.

Knowledge derived from study does not insure happiness because of the limitations and imperfections of understanding, but it directs to utilitarian and substantial welfare.

Rules for happiness formulated from investigation, experience, and study may become stimulative and protective under the direction of custom and law.

Personal Culture.

The formation of character is the most excellent constructive work of mind.

Its groundwork is in realizing—

1. The value of wisdom.
2. The need of education.
3. The fundamental laws of duty.
4. The value of moral obligation.
5. The sacredness of human affection.
6. The excellence of moral sentiment.
7. The faithfulness of love.

It's incentive is enlightened self-love as shown—

1. In bodily welfare through—
Physical sense.
Exercise.
Action.

Exhilaration.

Dietetics.

Hygienics.

Cosmetics.

Aesthetics.

The general conservation and extension
of physical strength.

2. In intellectual powers through—

The love of novelty.

The emotions of—

(1.) Surprise.

(2.) Wonder.

(3.) Astonishment.

(4.) Admiration.

The pleasures of—

(1.) Memory.

(2.) Genius.

(3.) Knowledge.

(4.) Intellectual dominion.

3. In the desire for—

Property.

Social favor.

Esteem.

Power.

4. In care for moral welfare as found in—

Self-knowledge.

Sanitary science.

Social science.

Self-Culture.

It succeeds by self-knowing and self-training derived from the receptive and constructive ability of mind.

It promotes self-possession—

1. In society.
2. In danger.
3. In business.
4. In desires.
5. In passions.
6. In amusements.

It educates by—

1. Practical study.
2. Comparative observation.
3. Social reciprocity in useful experience.
4. Self-control.
5. Self-direction.

Its sources of error are in—

1. Ignorance of facts.
2. Unenlightened passion.
3. Heedless habits.
4. Self-deception.
5. Unsystematic and desultory work.

The predominance of theological ideals may become—

1. Superstition.
2. Fanaticism.
3. Heedless enthusiasm.
4. Bigotry.
5. Dogmatism.
6. Persecution.

It may find in benevolent religious ideals the most consecrated forms of—

1. Veneration.
2. Devotion.
3. Gratitude.
4. Trust.
5. Moral fear.
6. Piety.
7. Faith, hope and love.
8. Truth.

Conduct in Relation to Self-Culture.

Its origin is in the triple nature and constitution of man—

1. Animal (the selfish).

Influences from mere animal nature governed by the will.

Happiness not worthiness, is its highest law.

Its motives rest solely in the gratification
of appetite regulated by expediency
and interest.

2. Rational. (The selfish and ethical).

Discriminations made by reason.

Supremacy its chief ambition.

Desire amenable only to duty.

Recognizes the beautiful and sublime.

Capable of knowing self and determin-
ing well-being.

3. Spiritual. (The ethical and religious).

Personal righteousness the chief duty,
manifesting itself in—

(1.) Benevolence.

(2.) Spiritual exhortation.

(3.) Worship.

Its motives are—

1. The instinctive ones of appetite; as—

Hunger.

Thirst.

Desire.

Love.

2. Those natural to self; as—

The evils seen in—

(1.) Sadness and sorrow.

(2.) Grief and anguish.

- (3.) Resentment and anger.
- (4.) Fear and terror.
- (5.) Dread and despair.
- (6.) Shame and remorse.
- (7.) Hatred and revenge.

The good known in—

- (1.) Contentment and satisfaction.
 - (2.) Gladness and joy.
 - (3.) Delight and desire.
 - (4.) Complacency and hope.
 - (5.) Gratification and gratitude.
 - (6.) Friendship, love and truth.
 - (7.) Antipathy against evil and wrong.
- 4. In the knowledge that good is valuable in itself and therefore a proper motive of choice and action.
 - 5. In the necessity of choosing the least evil and the better good.
 - 6. In the consciousness of a connection and sympathy between the choosing and the chosen.

Its motives are most apparent in—

- 1. The appetites; as—
Hunger.
Thirst.
Air.

Sleep.

Passion.

2. The affections; as—

Moral indignation.

Complacent love.

3. Benevolence; as—

Moral love.

Spiritual interest.

It has forces moving to action from within and from without which the individual can not explain and may not control. The “good and sufficient” reason, can never be the criterion of moral conduct, as it is simply the judgment of an individual not responsible in his judgments for humanity.

It should consider reputation—

1. By avoiding—

The appearance of evil.

The occasion of censure or ridicule.

The characteristics of—

(1.) Vanity and conceit.

(2.) Haughtiness and inordinate pride.

(3.) Assurance and arrogance.

(4.) Contempt and contumely.

(5.) Affectation and hypocrisy.

(6.) Censoriousness and envy.

2. By practicing—

Humility and modesty.

Honesty and charity.

Emulation and ambition.

Its interests are served best in the emoluments
arising from—

Sagacious compensations.

Benevolent reciprocity.

Patient industry.

Ambition in Relation to Self-Culture.

The pursuit of wealth is deleterious—

1. It is a violence of right in its incentives
of—

Force and fraud.

Deception and dishonesty.

Circumvention and distortion.

2. It induces servile conduct to obtain
ends.

3. It demands a mean compliance in order
to obtain results.

4. It fosters false professions.

5. It necessitates the prominence of self-
ishness and the neglect of personal
culture.

The love of power militates against personal
culture when it induces—

1. Obstinacy and intolerance.
2. Waywardness and bigotry.
3. Churlishness and tyranny.
4. Partisanship and unworthy ambition.

Safeguards are found against the perversions
of ambition in the predominance of the
affections as shown by—

1. Sympathy and gratitude.
2. Patriotism and piety.

The passions may prevent or ruin personal
culture by the natural causes of—

Timidity and heedlessness.

Cowardice and excessive anxiety.

Pessimism and despair.

The passions may be emotions leading to self-
enlightenment through—

Contentment and patience.

Resignation and fortitude.

Forbearance and forgiveness.

Faith, hope and love.

The judicial ethics in personal culture are—

1. Personal feeling by—
Self condemnation.
Self respect.
Repentance.
Humility.

Earnest aspiration.

2. Social righteousness in—

Love of good.

Aversion to evil.

Moral discernment.

Practical righteousness.

Divine righteousness.

Remedial ethics follows judgment through—

1. Association.

2. Education.

3. Theology.

The chief personal duties toward personal culture are—

1. Honesty.

2. Industry.

3. Usefulness.

Culture indicates a caste in human life according to—

1. Cleanliness or uncleanness.

2. Aspiration or passivity.

3. Sense or credulity.

4. Morality or immorality.

The chief personal duties toward success in the avocations of life are—

1. Perseverance and method.

2. Originality and enterprise.

3. Prudence and dispatch.
4. Attention and justice.
5. Foresight and veracity.
6. Moderation and interest.

The chief personal duties toward pleasure
are—

1. Simplicity.
2. Chastity.
3. Temperance.

Personal Influence.

Its general benevolence is found most in the
social affections; as—

1. Conjugal and parental.
2. Filial and fraternal.
3. Domestic and humane.
4. Local and friendly.
5. Civic and patriotic.
6. Constitutional and legislative.
7. International and racial.

Its special educative benevolence is found in—

1. The relations of sex, age and condition.
2. In economy.

Domestic and civil.

Political and national.

Its closest affinities are shown—

1. In religionary sympathies through—

Gratitude and adoration.

Obedience and love.

2. In the religious feeling through—

Devotion.

Fidelity.

Sympathy.

Faith.

Love—

Desire.

Peace—

Trust.

Hope.

(Joy.)

Cheerfulness—

(Gladness.)

Aspiration—

(Perfection.)

Reverence—

(Worship.)

Right doing may have any one of many motives. No mystery when prompted by fear, dread of punishment, hope of reward, love of praise, pride, vanity, worldly prudence, confusion as to one's own interests, force of conventionality, or habit. Only when such motives are wanting do we ascribe goodness.

Right-doing is outward, and means conduct looking at the well-being of others. Goodness is inward, and means making the welfare of others our interest—joy in another's joy, pain in his pain. The springs of our action come to lie elsewhere than in ourselves. We say in effect: "Thy ill is my ill, thy weal my weal, thy ends are my ends." Goodness amounts to altruism, or otherness, which in turn implies sympathy.

The foundations of morality, as given, are—

Self-interest.

Utility.

Laws of nature.

Laws of country.

Conscience.

The enlightenment from spiritual teachers.—

The Scriptures.

The moral motive is given as—

Pleasure against displeasure.

Love against hatred.

Moral love against passion.

Happiness against sorrow.

Moral love is the main source of faithfulness
to duty since it preserves—

Fidelity and justness.

Temperateness and courage.

Moral love has its force in the recognition of obligation—

Obligation implies—

1. A law.
2. An ideal.

Law and the ideal embody the science of duty.

Ethics has its foundation on—

Truth,—that is, invariable fact.

Love,—that is, enlightened help.

The Psychology of Ethics is completed only by constructing a philosophy of all that belongs to our personality as Moral beings. Each characteristic must be looked at, not only apart, but also in relation to other features of our Moral Nature.

The responsible steps in ethics are—

Choosing and acting from choice.

Action must be rational not instinctive.

Reason and impulse have an object.

Sensibility is the source of the conception of an object.

The object and the means of attaining it bring into use man's moral notions.

Duties and Rights are moral equivalents

resting equally upon the unchangeable warrant of moral law as the universal rule of human action. The ground on which any man can claim a right entitled to acknowledgment by others is exactly the ground on which by necessity he must own moral obligation.

And the conflict of harmony and duty begins.

Individual ethics requires—

The conservation of abilities and powers.

The consideration of circumstances and conditions.

Self-support.

The best possible use of time and talent.

Altruistic ethics are found in—

Benevolent reciprocity.

Desire for the well-being of mankind.

Theistic ethics may be included in the supreme devotion of mind in a system wholly material or human or Christian. It may be theistic reconstruction or theistic obedience. The chief theories as to the nature of virtuous action are found in—

Utilitarianism.

Perfectionism.

Rectitude.

Standards of right and wrong—

Moral sense.

Common sense.

Understanding.

Rule of right.

Fitness of things.

Law of nature.

Law of reason.

Justice.

Good order.

Truth.

Moral Philosophy is the rational explanation of our moral actions, moral nature, and moral relations. It is a science of the knowledge of moral distinctions, of the practice of morality, and of the existing moral system, or order in the universe. It is a theory of knowing and of being, but only of such knowing as is concerned with moral distinctions, and only of being which is capable of possessing and applying such knowledge.

The theories of Morality usually given are—

The theory of right to the exclusion of the ought.

The theory of alternate right and ought.

The theory of ought to the exclusion of right.

The theory of ought and right combined.

A question of pleasure or pain.

The impulse of desire.

The authority of superiors.

Ultimate Moral Rule.

Objective theories—

1. Authority of the state (Hobbes).

2. Revealed will of God (Descartes and Dymond).

3. Interest in the nature of things—
Fitness (Clarke).

Truth (Wollaston).

Relationship (Wayland).

Beauty of good will (Edwards).

The ultimate right is immutable. Ultimate truths are not the product of power, but must themselves condition all exertions of power. Power does not make the principles by which all power must be judged.

The ultimate right is universal. As in relation to all ultimate truth, no one can appropriate it and say of it, this is my truth; but that same truth will also be truth for every mind that looks into the same ground.

4. Highest happiness—

Unrestricted selfishness (Epicurus).

Moderation (Aristotle).

Religious (Paley).

Utility (Malthus).

Benevolence (Dwight and Taylor).

Subjective theories—

1. Susceptibility to pride gratified by flattery (Mandeville).

2. Inner reciprocal sympathy (Adam Smith).

3. An inner sense of moral distinctions (Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Brown and Schlegel).

4. Immediate intuition (Cudworth, Kant and Coleridge).

Ultimate right is immutable and universal.

Pure morality consists—

Pure mindedness.

Independence and decision.

The personal duties of self-control and self-culture.

The relative duties of kindness and respect.

Pure morality contemplates character and conduct solely in the light of the ultimate

rule of highest worthiness, and approves of only such character and conduct as stands conformed to that rule. This is the highest good and the only motive to right action, and can admit of no other motive in co-action with it. If other than the end of highest worthiness blend in the conduct, the life is not purely virtuous.

Moral sentiments which are in harmony with Conscience, are by consequence in harmony with our whole moral nature. Disregard of such sentiments, indicates some form of moral disorder.

Moral worth is shown in—

The magnanimity of experience.

The rational mildness of good breeding and modesty.

The intellectual judgment giving—

1. Power.
2. Worth.
3. Dignity.

Moral expediency is in

The development of conscience by—

1. Gratitude.
2. Sympathy.
3. Resentment against wrong.

4. Shame in wilful error.
5. Integrity and honor.
6. Hope and fear.
7. Joy and aversion.
8. Hatred and love.

All moral rights are perfect rights, irrespective of their being claimed by the person or enforced by society. A moral right rests wholly upon moral law, and must be uniform as that law. Positive law may not attempt to enforce all rights alike, because all rights do not admit of being enforced ; but this does not affect ethical validity of any of the rights of a moral being.

Moral rights are not self-exacted, nor can they be voluntarily surrendered. They are the necessary accompaniment of obligation under reign of moral law. They are as unchangeable as the nature of moral law itself, and the obligation which it imposes.

The Philosophy of Morals must be as applicable to the persons by whom I am surrounded as to myself, and must be capable of verification by them. But it need not be applicable to other living beings around me, or capable of verification in their experience.

The virtues show their value in the improvement of manhood and womanhood.

Intellectual—

1. In the pursuit of truth; as
Sincerity.
Impartiality.
Concentration.
Accuracy.
2. In communicating truth; as
Truthfulness.
Candor.
Consideration.
Prudence.
Wisdom.

Moral—

1. Egoistic; as
Temperance.
Self-respect.
Industry.
Thrift and honor.
2. Altruistic; as
Courage.
The benevolence of filial piety.
Public spirit.
Patriotism.
Philanthropy.

Politeness.

Loyalty.

Moral consideration may be divided into:

Obligations—

1. Right (Truth in action).

2. Duty (Justice in conduct).

The fulfillment of contracts and undertakings.

The fulfillment of expectations arising out of the natural order of association and society.

Sentiments—

1. Approbation.

2. Flattery.

3. Vindication.

Conditions—

1. Probity.

2. Usefulness.

3. Virtue.

4. Innocence.

5. Penitence.

6. Atonement.

7. Moral excellence.

Practice—

1. Temperance.

2. Asceticism.

3. Fasting.
4. Sobriety.
5. Purity.
6. Benevolence (To cultivate affections and confer happiness).

Moral conduct—

The sense of obligation comes from the consciousness of causation.

A responsible action implies power exerted with a free will and by intelligence.

A moral action supposes a knowledge of effects and their relation to right and wrong.

The moral quality of an action depends upon—

1. The elements of intention as shown in the outward act, the conception of the act, and the effect of its communication, but the design is the moral spirit.

All moral actions, being the actions of persons, presuppose intelligent observation, and are carried out by personal determination for a definite end. Every moral action, therefore, is capable of being regarded in three relations, according to its origin, progress, and result. With all these, intelligent self-determination

is concerned. A moral action, therefore, includes motive, act, and end. As these may be distinguished from each other, they may differ in moral quality. The motive may be right, though the act is wrong. The end is the voluntary purpose of the agent, which will commonly harmonize in character with the motive.

That the moral quality is in the intention, is conceded from the fact that the consensus of man in criticism is a blame or a praise of intention; and, also, because we distinguish between the instrument and the intention. The intention is none the less blameworthy or praiseworthy from accident or a lack of ability to fulfill.

2. The intention may not necessarily be wrong, though its successful act is proven to be wrong.
3. The intention may be wrong though its successful act may be right.
4. The intention may be a sin though it may never become an act.
5. Good intention, however, can never be an excuse for evil since the execution.
6. Successful intention is as cause and

effect and is subject to the same axioms.

7. Acts without virtuous intention are, therefore, not in themselves possessed of virtue though they may be good in their effects.
8. This does not imply that virtue being in the attention, therefore, is a creature of the mind. Virtue can be applied only in the abstract as a consequence of conscience and moral law.

Imagination is a conspicuous faculty of the mind, and is well known to every human being of sane understanding. We are so constituted that we are not confined to mere realities; but we can conjure up a thousand representations and combinations of things which never had, and never can have, any real existence. This power is the fruitful source of many of our pleasures as well as inconveniences; and hence its proper cultivation and guidance become of infinite importance to the well-being and happiness of man.

9. Therefore, as intention is the index of the individual life and imagination is the expression in the mind of desire,

so, whatever corrupts the imagination or sets up an imperfect ethical ideal for the intention, is not only destructively vicious but may be ranked as the common enemy of human happiness and welfare.

Personality is the first requisite for philosophising. Where there is not self-consciousness, or knowledge of self, as possessing power for self-direction, under conditions of intelligence, there cannot be a philosophy either of our own nature, or of any other form of being.

Personality is the basis of morality. Where there is not knowledge of self, as the intelligent source of action, there is no discrimination of motive, act, and end; and where such discrimination does not exist, there is no morality.

The obligations of moral nature provide—

1. That all wrong is outlawed and furnishes in itself no obligation but rejection.
2. As man's relationships change, new obligations are formed.
3. Obligations and relationships may be inseparable, as in parents and children.

4. Insufficient intellect or conscience or love in no way alters the nature of obligation.
5. The duty of investigation as to relation and obligation is a part of all responsibility.
6. The feeling of innocence and self-justification is in no way a proof of real innocence or justification.
7. Nothing can affect the nature of an action or change its inherent right or wrong.
8. Intellect informs us of relations, conscience of the obligations involved, and love makes the obligations desirable.

The principles of moral conduct—

1. Before an action requires decision as to its moral qualities, respects for the doubts of conscience and obedience to the monitions of justice are demanded.
2. After an action, the only concern is how to make its benefits more complete or to remedy any evil it may have contained or occasioned. The mind should reflect impartially and be thankful for good results. If mixed results are obtained, mo-

tives should be analyzed; and, if the motives or the means were wrong—

Suffer rebuke.

Make reasonable amends.

Fortify self against a repetition of the wrong.

3. The steps in the consummation of design are—

The fixation of a definite purpose.

The discovery of the means.

The use of the means.

4. Reputation being not only the personal happiness and social capital of the individual, but also a valuable, if not a necessary, condition of success in life, publicity should not be given to errors of action without a needful public benefit being in view.

Bad motives can be proven only circumstantially and are, therefore, not to be charged except under urgent need and for the most wholesome results.

5. The truth necessitates candor in which there is no wilful untruth by suppression or expression. The unknown is not to

be uttered as true, and the truth must not be falsely conveyed.

6. Protection of the innocent, charity and mercy must prevail, but charity to be a virtue must proceed from sincere compassion and its performance must be sympathetic and prudent.

7. The practice of resentment is—
Incompatible with benevolence.
Imprudent as to our own happiness.
Injurious in all its relations and results.

8. Forbearance and forgiveness is most wise because—

Those who are unjust to us inflict harm upon themselves, and are fit subjects for our compassion.

It is a noble and satisfying independence that can look with pity and charity upon transgression.

The primary truth of reciprocal morality is to do unto others as we would have them do to us.

9. Promises should be kept as far as the altruistic principles of right prevail, because—

It is agreeable to the fitness of affairs.
It is conformable to reason and to nature.
It is essential to truth.
It is necessary to social faith and public welfare.
It is the basis of all social contract.
It is the first principle of personal obligation.

10. The essential personal duties must be jealously preserved, such as—

Self-respect.

Self-control.

Self-defense.

Personal purity, which may be cultivated by—

(1.) Suppressing from the imagination all impure images.

(2.) Avoiding amusements that suggest impure thoughts.

(3.) Avoiding such literature, pictures and people as afford evil suggestions.

Being busy with the fulfillment of ennobling aspirations.

The personal devotion needed in

frugality and industry, and self-culture.

II. The conjugal affections are the most powerful natural influences bearing upon moral conduct—

Friendship between the sexes should have no thought not contained in the moral purposes of social welfare.

Mutual sympathy, usefulness, and affection form the most potent bonds of marriage.

Sincerity of demeanor and honesty of purpose are essential to wholesome results in all social affairs.

Intimacies between the sexes in marriageable relations should be devoid of all personal familiarities.

In conjugal relations there should be an absolute union of—

(1.) Affection.

(2.) Interest and reputation.

(3.) Parental devotion.

(4.) Regard for each others relatives and friends.

(5.) Domestic responsibilities.

(6.) Mutual fidelity, chastity, for-

bearance, and care for the common welfare.

12. The appearance of evil should be avoided as far as possible in all things with the purity of life and the inspiration of home maintained in all the affairs of life.

13. Honest conduct has its sources in—

- (1.) Prudent judgment.
- (2.) Careful information.
- (3.) Self knowledge.
- (4.) Conscience honored.
- (5.) The influence of moral love and the mutualities of home.

Rewards in—

- (1.) The increasing merits and enjoyments of life.
 - (2.) The admiration, esteem, and friendship of those who are honest and honorable.
 - (3.) The fulfillments of practical and worthy ambitions.
 - (4.) The satisfactions of an irreproachable and symmetrical life.
- A harmonial growth.
An example devoid of offense.
An old age of safety and peace.

14. The misconduct of self should produce—

Self-reproach.

Remorse.

Reform.

15. The misconduct of others should produce—

Solicitude and pity.

Antipathy and protective estrangement.

Judicious suspicion.

Jealousy for justice.

Resentment and anger.

Never hatred or revenge.

16. The results of conduct are self-recording in memory.

The evil brings—

(1.) A feverish conscience.

(2.) Personal debasement.

(3.) Social condemnation.

(4.) Loss of prestige.

(5.) Endangered usefulness of life.

The good brings—

(1.) A pleasing memory.

(2.) A happy conscience.

(3.) The evident esteem of good people.

(4.) The possession of wise accomplishments.

(5.) The peace of rational reflection.

(6.) The satisfaction of life well lived.

The building of character.

The forces included are—

1. Exercise and self-effort.

2. Seriousness and decision.

Sympathy by the common use of language, implies an interest in the welfare of others, and may be considered in two respects, being an interest in their joy, or an interest in their sorrow.

3. Sympathy and tact.

4. Candor and honesty.

5. Simplicity and ambition.

6. Thought control.

7. Cleanliness and respect.

8. Self-possession and ease of manner.

9. Sincerity and sociability.

10. Promptness and directness.

11. Earnestness and thoroughness.

12. Etiquette and self-control.

13. Kindness and charity.

14. Refinement and choice companionship.

15. Politeness and dignity.

16. Progress and optimism.

The forces of the excluded are—

1. Insinuation and flattery.
2. Slang and profanity.
3. Sulkiness and obstinacy.
4. Flippancy and excess.
5. Low humor and fads.
6. Envy and revenge.
7. Excitement and superstition.
8. Gossip and sarcasm.
9. Temptation and hasty promises.
10. Unwholesome influences.

Rectitude as a theory of conduct and thought is accepted by the general consciousness of mankind as the primary element of virtue.

The theories of virtue are involved in metaphysical speculations, but it is agreed that—

Virtue is the right, the good and true, as vice is the wrong, bad and false.

Virtue must conform to truth and justice as found in benevolence and wisdom.

Virtue must have the approval of conscience and be the emulation of right and pure motives in order to conduce to the useful, profitable and beneficial, and to

produce the highest happiness and welfare.

Virtues may be classified—

1. As to general truth.
Truthfulness and veracity.
2. As to personal character.
Uprightness and righteousness.
Integrity and probity.
Conscientiousness and honor.
Genuineness and consistency.
3. As to altruistic principles.
Faithfulness and constancy.
Frankness and candor.
Straightforwardness and good faith.
Trustworthiness and incorruptibility.
4. In a negative sense.
Naturalness and innocence.
Simplicity and guilelessness.
5. As to duty.

In time—

- (1.) Diligence and promptness.
- (2.) Expeditiousness and punctuality.

Manner and method—

- (1.) Accuracy and correctness.
- (2.) Exactness and precision.

(3.) Strictness and system.

(4.) Order and method.

Education—

Instruction.

Culture.

Discovery.

Justice.

Generally—

1. Compensation.

2. Equity.

Specifically—

1. Honesty.

2. Fairness.

3. Impartiality.

Altruistically—

1. Obedience and loyalty.

2. Civility and politeness.

3. Chivalry and courtesy.

4. Urbanity and etiquette.

As to merit—

1. Respect and reverence.

2. Deference and admiration.

3. Veneration and awe.

As to demerit—

1. Just indignation.

2. Proper resentment.

As to the good offices of others—

1. Gratitude.
2. Thankfulness.

Wisdom.

Generally—

1. Judgment and discernment.
2. Acuteness and discrimination.
3. Acumen and penetration.

As to preservation—

1. Prudence and discretion.
2. Vigilance and watchfulness.
3. Forethought and carefulness.
4. Circumspection and cautiousness.

As to providence—

1. Frugality.
2. Economy.
3. Thrift.

As to education—

1. Observation and attention.
2. Examination and application.
3. Study and reflection.
4. Diligence and industry.
5. Sedulousness and assiduousness.

Benevolence.

Generally—

1. Charity and love.

2. Kindness and humane feelings.
3. Disinterestedness and loving kindness.
4. Self-denial and self-devotion.
5. Tenderness and self-sacrifice.

Altruistically—

1. Sympathy and compassion.
2. Pity and kind-heartedness.
3. Liberality and generosity.

As to faults in others—

1. Forbearance and forgiveness.
2. Mercifulness and indulgence.
3. Leniency and clemency.
4. Peaceableness and peacemaking.

As to good in others—

1. Esteem.
2. Regard.

Family love—

1. Paternal.
2. Maternal.
3. Filial.
4. Fraternal.
5. Conjugal.

Social love to—

1. Servant and master.
2. Friends and neighbors.
3. Fellow citizens and countrymen.

Personal disposition—

1. Good will and humor.
2. Good nature and agreeableness.
3. Amiability and geniality.
4. Affability and graciousness.
5. Obliging and benign.
6. Complaisant and accommodating.
7. Thoughtful and considerate.
8. Suave and accessible.

Self-control.

In regard to desire—

1. Temperance and decision.
2. Determination and resolution.
3. Fixity and tenacity of purpose.
4. Steadiness and stability.
5. Unchangeableness and earnestness.
6. Energy and zeal.
7. Ardor and fervor.
8. Enthusiasm and self-conquest.

In regard to appetites—

1. Abstemiousness and sobriety.
2. Moderation and chastity.
3. Continence and purity.
4. Cleanliness and modesty.
5. Reserve and consideration.

As to control of emotion—

1. Boldness and daring.
2. Bravery and resolution.
3. Enterprise and valor.
4. Undauntedness and intrepidity.
5. Fortitude and heroism.

As to healthy development—

1. Cheerfulness and hopefulness.
2. Confidence and self-reliance.
3. Calmness and endurance.
4. Collectedness and composedness.

As to pride—

1. Humility and lowliness.
2. Diffidence and fractableness.
3. Modesty and docility.
4. Forbearance and independence.
5. Nobleness and magnanimity.

As to control of animal spirits—

1. Soberness and quietness.
2. Sedateness and tranquillity.
3. Staidness and seriousness.
4. Solemnity and gravity.
5. Serenity and suavity.

As to development of taste—

1. Tidiness and neatness.
2. Decency and decorum.
3. Propriety and seemliness.

4. Fitness and suitableness.

5. Becoming and tasteful.

As to control of temper—

1. Gentleness and meekness.

2. Mildness and tolerance.

3. Indulgence and long-suffering.

4. Forbearance and patience.

5. Contentment and resignation.

Vice.

Lack of truth—

1. Generally.

Lying and falsehood.

Misrepresentation and perjury.

Inconstancy and untruth.

Error and mistake.

Exaggeration and incoherence.

Incongruity and falsity.

2. Non-fulfillment of duty.

Unfaithfulness and treachery.

Perfidy and procrastination.

Dilatory and unpunctual.

3. As to others—

Vilification and reviling.

Calumny and detraction.

Aspersions and defamation.

Libel and slander.

- Depreciation and disparagement.
Scandal and gossip.
4. In weakness of moral intention—
Compromise and temporizing.
Trimming and time-serving.
Flattery and adulation.
Parasite and sycophant.
Fawning and servility.
 5. In weakness of character—
Prevarication and equivocation.
Evasion and ambiguity.
Shuffling and quibbling.
Cavilling and vagueness.
Looseness and laxity.
Indefiniteness and indeterminateness.
 6. As to plausibility—
Speciousness and sophistry.
Superficiality and shallowness.
 7. As to pretense—
Double-dealing and hypocrisy.
Insincerity and dissembling.
Feigning and disguise.
Simulation and hollowness.
Dissimulation and affectation.
 8. Involving stealth—
Crafty and wily.

Artful and sly.
Deceitful and cunning.
Disingenuous and clandestine.
Underhand and intrigue.
Quiet and concealment.
Secrecy and subtlety.

9. Involving fraud—

Knavery.
Imposition.
Dishonesty.

Lack of justice.

1. Generally—

Unfair and unprincipled.
Injustice and unreasonableness.

2. Offenses against right—

Affront and indignity.
Insult and outrage.
Coarseness and roughness.
Bluntness and pertness.
Rude and cross.
Discourteous and uncivil.
Impolite and obstructive.
Impudence and injury.
Interference and officiousness.
Fussiness and busy-body.
Impertinence and formality.

3. In personal government—
Arbitrary and tyrannical.
Despotic and severe.
Strictness and rigor.
Threatening and stern.
Rough and dictatorial.
Austerity and bribing.
 4. As to a subject—
Treachery and sedition.
Insurrection and insubordination.
Disloyalty and rebellion.
Revolution and lawlessness.
Disobedience and disrespect.
Unthankfulness and ingratitude.
- Lack of wisdom.
1. Defective judgment—
Ignorance and infatuation.
Injudicious and short-sighted.
Eccentricity and foolishness.
Senselessness and garrulity.
Talkative and loquacious.
 2. Disregard of harm—
Negligence and remissness.
Imprudence and carelessness.
Heedlessness and thoughtlessness.
Unwariness and inattention.

Inconsideration and forgetfulness.

3. Disregard of comfort—

Improvvidence and waste.

Squandering and prodigality.

Lack of benevolence.

1. Generally—

Malice and malevolence.

Malignity and cruelty.

Selfishness and unkindness.

2. As to distress and faults—

Insensibility of ruthlessness.

Churlishness and illiberality.

Sentimentality and implacability.

Taciturn and unforgiving.

Uncharitable and unrelenting.

Harsh and merciless.

3. As to social relations—

Inhospitable.

Inaccessible.

Unsocial.

4. As to disposition—

Ill-nature and ill-will.

Annoying and ungracious.

Teasing and provoking.

Irritating and exasperating.

Tantalizing and vexing.

Lack of self-control.

1. As to want of energy—
Indifference and apathy.
Coldness and lethargy.
Indolence and idleness.
Sluggishness and laziness.
Listlessness and supineness.
2. As to misapplied energy.
Impulsiveness and caprice.
Whim and humor.
Restlessness and fickleness.
Changeableness and variableness.
Hesitation and vacillation.
Indecision and pliability.
Weakness and obsequiousness.
Hurry and precipitation.
3. As to ill-regulated will power—
Waywardness and wilfulness.
Pertinacy and obstinacy.
Perverseness and contumacy.
Unruly and headstrong.
Incorrigible and refractory.
Unmanageable and obdurate.
Callous and doggedness.
4. As to ruined will power—
Declension and degeneration.

Deterioration and disability.

5. As to appetites—

Luxuriousness and voluptuary.
Immoderation and intemperance.
Sensuality and epicure.
Gourmand and gluttony.
Licentious and dissolute.
Reprobate and profligate.
Immodesty and immorality.
Uncleanliness and unchastity.
Lewdness and wantonness.
Lechery and debauchery.

6. As to mental desires—

Avidity and covetousness.
Greediness and avarice.
Sordid and niggardly.
Usury and gambling.

7. As to the emotions—

Audacity and rashness.
Termerity and recklessness.
Fright and dismay.
Shyness and bashfulness.
Sneaking and cowardice.
Dolefulness and despondency.
Melancholy and despair.

Pride is a consciousness or belief of some

superiority in ourselves over others, attended with a desire, that others should be sensible of it.

Self-conceit and arrogance.

Dogmatism and vanity.

Prying and presumption.

Ostentation and boasting.

Pedantry and foppishness.

Supercilious and censorious.

Sneering and overbearing.

Dictatorial and domineering.

Ridicule and mockery.

Jeering and scoffing.

Arrogance. This is the ostentatious assumption of superior importance, and thus exhibits the inflation of self-conceit and implies the contemptuous disparagement of others. Simply as a man, one has no prerogative above another. If moral qualities make one more excellent than another, it can never permit the virtuous to display it ostentatiously, and if any adventitious circumstances place one man in a higher position than another, that will never justify arrogance and assumed self-consequence.

Meanness and paltriness.

Shamelessness and baseness.

Venality and unmanliness.

Mistrust and jealousy.

Envy and mockery.

8. As to passions—

Anger and wrath.

Resentment and rage.

Vehemence and violence.

Boisterous and turbulent.

Fear is a simple emotion of pain, caused by an object, which we anticipate will be injurious to us, attended with a desire of avoiding such object or its injurious effects.

Sarcasm and satire.

Irony and abuse.

Dissension and altercation.

Quarrelsome and pugnacious.

Sourness and bitterness.

Pique and irritation.

Discontentment and chagrin.

Fretfulness and crossness.

Peevishness and petulance.

Harshness and asperity.

Spite and rancor.

Vituperation and scurrility.

Insolence and rapacity.

Sanguinary and brutish.

9. As to mental ability.

Awkward and clumsy.

Unseemly and uncouth.

Abrupt and rough.

Fastidious and dainty.

Squeamish and finicky.

10. As to animal spirits—

Giddiness and volatility.

Lightness and flightiness.

Levity and inconsideration.

11. As to desire to comment—

The sources of detraction—

1. Unmerited prosperity.

2. Idleness and impurity.

3. Impudence and gossip.

4. Levity and intemperance.

5. Effeminate complaisance.

6. Caprice and curiosity.

7. Rash judgment.

8. Malice and contempt.

9. Ingratitude and hypocrisy.

10. Jealousy and blind zeal.

11. Wrath and revenge.

The inhumanity of detractors is shown in
that—

1. It is contrary to justice.
2. It spoils just judgment.
3. It hurts reputation.
4. It injures credit.
5. It causes hatred and ill-treatment.

Conscience is that power of mind by which moral law is discovered to each individual for the guidance of his conduct. It is the reason as that discovers to us absolute moral truth—having the authority of sovereign moral law. It is an essential requisite for the direction of an intelligent free-will agent, and affords the basis for moral obligation and responsibility in human life.

Conscience in relation to conduct—

Kinds—

1. True and lax.
2. Scrupulous and erroneous.
3. Certain and perplexed.
4. Clear and doubtful.
5. Fixed and probable.

As a monitor it includes—

1. An active intelligent belief in right and wrong.
2. A desire for the constant prevailing of right.

3. Peace in the right and unrest in the wrong.
4. A belief in the ultimate profit of right against the temporary loss of the present.
5. Personal influence and effort for the right and against the wrong.
6. Delight and faith in the final triumph of right.

In its demands for right it regards—

1. Benevolence and protection as to the injurious.
2. Moral detestation of all wrong.
3. Pity and consideration for all wrong.
4. Reasonable means to reclaim the offender and at the same time to protect society.
5. Forbearance and forgiveness.
6. Official justice.

Its office is—

1. A discriminating power which may be improved by culture and wisdom.
2. An impulsive power restraining from evil and urging the good.
3. A source of reproof and approval.

In the culture of conscience these are essential—

1. Enlightenment as to duty.
2. Definiteness of purpose.
3. Attention and discrimination.
4. Brightened by good and not dulled by evil.
5. Impulses and emotions not mistaken for conscience.
6. Violence should never be done to conscience.
7. It must be obeyed promptly.
8. Obedience must be determined and persistent.
9. Faithful consideration for experience and superior wisdom.
10. In every failure must be repentance, restitution and reformation.
11. Thankfulness for help and gratefulness for good.
12. The sources of enlightenment and culture for conscience are in—
Reflection.
Careful meditation upon the excellent thoughts and character of the world.
Earnest study of the problems of right

and wrong presented in literature,
history and the current events of hu-
man life.

As to the action of conscience it may be—

1. Prospective.
2. Retrospective.
3. Instantaneous.

As to function, conscience is—

1. A moral sense.
2. A moral judgment.

Conduct and conscience may be affected by—

The influence of those trusted.

Circumstances that bias judgment.

Impulses and emotions that exaggerate the
object.

Bodily conditions of health.

Character, as distinct from nature, is an es-
tablished order of disposition which by de-
velopment gradually acquires strength, in ac-
cordance with the rules of life most commonly
acted upon. Its measure is found in the pre-
vailing dispositions; the standard of measure-
ment, in the moral law. Character is, there-
fore, good or bad, according as the reigning
dispositions are in harmony with conscience,
or antagonistic to its authority.

Heredity—

1. Kinds—

Direct, the child resembling its parents.

Reversional, the child resembling its grandparents.

Collateral, the child resembling its uncle or aunt.

Pre-marital, the child resembling former associates.

Prenatal, the child's disposition affected by influences upon it previous to birth.

2. Temperaments—

1. Phlegmatic.

Dull and sluggish.

2. Sanguine.

Hopeful and animated.

3. Choleric.

Irritable and passionate.

4. Bilious.

Morose and energetic.

5. Melancholic.

Dispirited and gloomy.

6. Lymphatic.

Enthusiastic and harsh.

7. Nervous.

Excitable and vigorous.

Education in general—

In its general idea, it has—

1. Nature.
2. Form.
3. Limits.

In its special elements, it is—

1. Intellectual.
2. Physical.
3. Moral.

In its particular systems—

1. It is national.

In the passive state; as—

- (1.) The family in China.
- (2.) Caste in India.
- (3.) Monks in Thibet.

In the active state, as—

- (1.) Military. in Persia.
- (2.) Priestly in Egypt.
- (3.) Industrial in Phoenicia.

In the individual state, as—

- (1.) Aesthetic in ancient Greece.
- (2.) Practical in ancient Rome.
- (3.) Abstract in Northern Barbarians.

2. It is theocratic, as—

With the Jews.

3. It is humanitarian.

For special callings, as—

(1.) In piety.

(2.) Philanthropy.

(3.) Industry.

(4.) Ambition.

To satisfy public demands, as—

The public school.

For ideal self-culture, as—

(1.) Ethical societies.

(2.) Literary clubs.

For an enlightened citizenship for the
masses of people, as—

(1.) The Chautauqua.

(2.) University extension.

4. It is constructive through—

The home.

School.

Society.

Business.

The impulses of—

(1.) Theory.

(2.) Observation.

(3.) Influence.

(4.) Experience.

Paternal government—

The home—

1. Sovereigns [father and mother.]
2. Subjects [sons and daughters.]

The family—

1. Its origin in marriage.
2. Its integrity and honor as consequential and imperative to its members as is the national integrity to the nation.

The family—

Protection—

1. Encroachments.
2. Prevention of disease.
3. Cure of disease.

Labor—

1. Production and supply.
2. Thrift.

Social life.

Education.

3. Marriage.

Choice should be—

- (1.) Free.
- (2.) Reciprocal.
- (3.) Considerate.
- (4.) Provident.

(5.) Unalterable.

The marriage bond is the only adequate acknowledgment of the biological and ethical laws appointed to regulate human society. In this alone is there realization of the truth, that the family is the primary form of society. In accordance with the common obligations imposed by moral law, interpreted and applied to the special relations of husband and wife, marriage implies a mutual pledge to life-long, consistent endeavor to reach in family history a high standard of attainment in physical, intellectual, moral, and religious life. A lower ideal is unworthy of rational government of the social life.

The commitment made wisely enough
to be for life.

Official sanction.

Social ratification.

4. Parents—

Authority of father and mother concurrent.

They must protect, train and maintain
their children during minority.

The right and welfare of children must

be the prevailing consideration with parents.

5. Children—

Prompt subjection and obedience to parental authority.

Respect and reverence.

Tenderness, consideration, and support for parents in their helplessness.

Disputes between children should find in parents an ever ready arbitration.

Children should receive all questionable information concerning life direct from parents.

All personal affairs of children and youths should be under the advisory confidence and care of parents.

6. The youth, girl or boy.

As personal responsibility increases, ideas, conduct and personal welfare should become more distinct, definite, and determined.

In the progress of thought, observation and experience, there should continue to be more well-directed concentration of effort, economy of means, and conservation of force.

An understanding of capabilities, value, use and limitations, is of the utmost importance.

An appreciation of health and character—

(1.) No other possessions can ever contain so much safety and value for the individual as those two conditions.

(2.) They form the only substantial basis of happiness and success.

(3.) They are the only satisfactory foundations of progress and achievement.

(4.) Character is the solitary genius of every individual imperial over all the environments and every condition possible to life.

The proper use of vocation and money.

Devotion to the art and wisdom of productive labor.

Discrimination and determination in the functions of love and will.

General government.

State exists for the exercise of civil government.

State makes the constitution.

The individual is sovereign within the freedom allowed by state.

Service. Every man is bound to render that service to the state which in his circumstances are legally demanded. He may not shrink from official stations, or military duties when his country calls. He must judge if higher claims clash with the commands of his country and responsibly act accordingly, but in a righteous call of his country to any service, no citizen may hesitate and delay without becoming immoral. No government can last which cannot control the services of its citizens. All disrespect to the state is a disgrace to the man.

Pure morality can never be the end of governmental administration.

Civil law is the constraint of individual choice, by state sovereignty, for the end of public freedom.

Civil law to be, the constraint of individual

choice, by state sovereignty, for the end
of public freedom.

Necessity has no obligation or law.

The civil laws are inoperative in the midst
of war.

As political government involves a modified limitation of personal liberties for the purpose of securing the common good, it is essential to its constitution and procedure, that it be acknowledged that there are liberties which men cannot, consistently with moral law, surrender, and with which political government cannot interfere without stepping beyond its natural boundaries. If only there be protection for the rights of all, and provision for the common good, there must be unfettered liberty of thought, utterance, and action. Political government becomes the bulwark of civil and religious liberty only by rigid acknowledgment of the limits of its own sphere.

The nature of man indicates a necessity for
restrictive and prohibitive government.

Without positive law, society could not exist.

Sovereignty should not attempt action beyond its own capacity for governing.

It should not legislate beyond the subject's capacity for obedience.

It may not legislate in violation of pure morality.

The authority of the state. Man must live in civil society, and this cannot be sustained without political regulations. The state, through its constituted authorities, legislates, and to this the citizen is bound in unquestioning obedience.

Punishments must be impartial and only upon personal responsibility.

Penalty should be reformatory as well as deterrent.

Pure morality may be protected but not directly influenced by legislation.

Original rights behind the power of civil authority must not be infringed upon; as—

1. Equality in freedom.
2. Unrestrained thought and belief.
3. Freedom of conscience.
4. Unrestrained action in all things not subversive of public freedom or morality.
5. Innocent until proven guilty.

6. Special privileges to none.
7. No one the privilege to evade law.
8. The criminal has no right to sympathy against law.

The rights of government—

1. It must have sovereign control of all property.
2. It is the supreme proprietor of the soil.
3. It must consider the morals and needs of its citizens.
4. It should prohibit injurious practices.
5. Sumptuary and sanitary laws are to that extent advisable and irreproachable.
6. The helplessly poor must be humanely provided for.

It must endeavor to promote prosperity by inducing the conditions that afford opportunities for individual enterprise.

It must eliminate, as far as its rights extend, such conditions as influence immorality and pauperism; as—

Prohibitory laws. Individual choices may demand complete prohibition in many cases,

on account of their contradiction to the public freedom, and in all such cases the state has the right to enact and enforce prohibitory laws. The very end of state sovereignty is to guard the public freedom against all particular encroachment, and if it has a right to be, and to do anything, its right to restrain anything which infringes upon the public freedom is manifest.

- (1.) Destruction of the slums.
- (2.) Beggars and tramps sent to institutions specially provided to enforce thrift and industry.
- (3.) Vagabonds and idlers not allowed to congregate in public places or where their vagabondage may be encouraged by mutual example.
- (4.) An end of indiscriminate giving.
- (5.) Saving the children and bringing them up in conditions that stimulate self-activity.
- (6.) Enforcing pauper parasites to be self-helpful.
- (7.) Save the unfortunate and protect the innocent.

Revolution against government—

Justifiable when public freedom is imperiled.

Revolutionary persons begin the work at their peril.

Law of nations—

International regulations must be founded upon a basis of reciprocal benefit and pure morality.

Treaties can not involve immoralities.

War is righteous only when in defense of public freedom.

Ideal law has perfect freedom as its absolute end.

Ideal justice is that absolute desert should be requited.

Axioms of truth in the determination of right and wrong for the individual, society or the nation must be—

Clear and precise.

Plainly self-evident.

Never in conflict with other truth.

Supported by universal instinct and the best consensus of reason.

Human progress.

Moral sense in regard to moral excellence
is—

1. Unconsciously utilitarian.
2. Instinctively ideal.

Universal conscience judges—

1. Never by the act.
2. Always by rank of motive.

Human conduct is the result of motive
conceived in the idea of what is—

1. Most enjoyable; as—
momentary pleasure.
2. Most desirable; as—
Revenge.
3. Most conducive to success; as—
Deception.
4. Wisest and best; as—

Benevolence and providence.

The education of desire culminating in the
establishment of character is the supreme
moral and social achievement of the in-
dividual.

The education of the conscience to rule ac-
cording to the moral law of absolute
truth, is the greatest achievement to be
considered in the welfare of the race.

METAPHYSICS.

Metaphysics, a name originally applied to those books of Aristotle which followed his "Physics," and which his editors called "the books after the Physics." In modern times the word has been variously applied and seems to assume quite a distinct meaning as employed by different authors. With the Germans, metaphysics is a science purely speculative, which soars beyond the bounds of experience. The objects of this science are supersensual ideas, unattainable by experience, and the difficulty of defining the word lies in the circumstance that the very knowledge of the ideas sought requires some proficiency in the study. Hence to one altogether unacquainted with speculative philosophy it is almost impossible to explain the meaning of the word "metaphysics" as used in this sense. The very possibility of a science beyond experience has been denied by a great number of philosophers, and many works called metaphysical should rather be termed inquiries into the pos-

sibility of metaphysics. Thus Kant's celebrated work, the "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," is a mere inquiry into the possibility of a theoretical science of things beyond experience, which terminates with a denial of such possibility; and hence some modern philosophers have considered Kant as no metaphysician, but as a critic of the mental faculties, whose labors were to be the precursors of a new system of speculation. On the other hand, a work like Spinoza's "Ethics" is purely metaphysical. He assumes the possibility of his science, and, proceeding from a number of axioms, speculates accordingly. Those who deny the possibility of metaphysics deny even the right to assume any axioms as applicable to a sphere beyond experience; and those who did assume them, as Spinoza, Liebnitz, and Wolf, were called by the Kantians dogmatists, in opposition to their own appellation of critics. The great point to be established prior to metaphysical speculation is the identity, or at least the necessary concurrence, of thought and being. This once established, speculative inquiry may proceed, as the results of logical investigation must in such a case, of course,

concur with the nature of being itself; but the sceptics always deny the right of assuming such identity or concurrence, while on the other hand different theories have been adopted to prove them, such as those of harmony between body and spirit,—of the non-being of body altogether, except as an affection of spirit,—of an absolute identity between thought and being, &c. It may be as well to observe that the critical philosophy, which assumes nothing but the “I” or “ego,” and the laws of thought (Fichte deducing even the latter from the axiom, “I am I”), has Descartes for its author, whose “Cogito, ergo sum,” lies at the basis of most modern systems.

In England, the word metaphysics is usually applied to denote the philosophy of mind, as distinguished from that of matter. This science treats of the association of ideas, memory, and various phenomena of mind; and as it consists merely in collecting facts and making inductions like any other experimental science, its possibility is no more questionable than that of chemistry or electricity. However, Locke’s “Essay on the Human Under-

standing," as a denial of any source of knowledge other than experience, may be put at the side of Kant's "Kritik," as containing inquiries of similar nature, though the results be different; Berkeley's "Idealism" may be compared with the "Wissenschaftslehre" of Fichte and the Common-sense theory of Reid with the views of Jacobi. The philosophy of mind as an experimental science has been chiefly treated by the modern Scotch philosophers, among whom the late Sir W. Hamilton holds a high place.

REASON.

Reason, according to the common notion, is the highest faculty of the human mind, by which man is distinguished from brutes, and which enables him to contemplate things spiritual as well as material, to weigh all that can be said or thought for and against them, and hence to draw conclusions, and to act accordingly. A man may therefore be said to possess reason in proportion as he actually exercises that power, that is, reasons and acts ac-

cording to the conclusions or results at which he has arrived. In such expressions as "We have reason to believe such an account," or "He has no reason to be dissatisfied," the word "reason" does not signify the mental power itself, but the conclusion or result of the process of reasoning, in contradistinction to motives, which are never the results of mental operations, but merely outward circumstances by which our actions are influenced.

Thus far reason is of a purely practical nature, and Kant therefore divided reason (if we may venture to translate his word *Vernunft* by the English word reason) into practical and theoretical. The latter, which is also called pure, ideal, or transcendental reason, is, according to him, the mind's power of producing ideas a priori from its own resources, or the power of conceiving things and their attributes which lie beyond the sphere of our experience, such as infinity, the absolute, God, the supreme good, &c. How far our knowledge of these things can extend is shown in the work of Kant, entitled "*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*," or "Criticism of Pure Reason."

Reason, in its practical acceptation, forms ideas a posteriori, in as far as it derives them from a consideration and comparison of the phenomena of the external world, endeavors to discover unity in variety, and trace all phenomena to one source, a supreme reason, of which human reason is only a reflex.

Schelling defines reason to be the identity of the subjective and the objective, that is, the identity of the power which knows and that which it knows, which includes the knowledge of this identity. As the original identity, says he, exists in God, or is God, reason is a direct knowledge or an intellectual perception of God, of whom no indirect knowledge is possible. Hence God and reason are essentially of the same nature; they are identical: God is in reason, and reason is in God.

EVIDENCE.

That which makes truth evident, or renders it evident to the mind that it is truth. It is generally limited to the proof of propositions as distinguished from axioms or intuitions.

Evidence is of two kinds, demonstrative and probable. Demonstrative evidence is of such a character that no person of competent intellect can fail to see that the conclusion is necessarily involved in the premises. Mathematics rests on demonstrative evidence. All the propositions of Euclid are simply deductions from the definitions, axioms being assumed and postulates granted. But in every matter involving the establishment of a concrete fact bearing on human conduct, demonstrative evidence is not obtainable, and the mind must content itself with probable evidence. Even in mathematics the premises are not concrete facts but abstract hypotheses. Probable evidence is as if one held a delicate balance in the hand, casting into one scale every atom of evidence making for a proposition, and into the other all that could be adduced against it. According as the one or the other scale preponderates the proposition is accepted or rejected. Probable evidence may be of all conceivable degrees, from the faintest presumption to almost perfect certainty.

In Law. Proof, either written or unwritten, of allegations in issue between parties. The

following are the leading rules of procedure. (1) The sole object and end of evidence being to ascertain the several disputed points or facts in issue, no irrelevant evidence should be admitted. (2) The point in issue is to be proved by the party who asserts the affirmative. (3) Hearsay evidence is not admitted. Legal evidence is sometimes divided into direct and circumstantial. In courts of law parole evidence, that is, evidence by word of mouth, is that which is adopted, while in investigations in equity written evidence by affidavit is required. Another division of evidence is into primary and secondary. The production of a letter is primary evidence; the effort to prove what the contents of a lost document were is secondary evidence. (Wharton.)

In Apologetics. The evidence for the genuineness and authenticity of Scripture are external, internal, and collateral. The external evidences are those which tend to prove, on the testimony of other writers, that the books were written by the persons to whom they are attributed. The internal evidence is the evidence afforded by reading the books them-

selves, and noting to what extent their style, subject-matter, and moral and spiritual tone afford evidence in their own favor. The collateral evidences are those brought from various sources to supplement the other two.

SOPHISTS.

The race of sophists took its rise in Athens about the 5th century B. C., when Athens was a real democracy. From the necessity every man was under of pleading his own cause before the dicastery, in any case before the court, whether as plaintiff or defendant; from the political power which every citizen possessed, but could scarcely exercise with effect unless able to speak fluently; the teaching of rhetoric, or the arts of speaking and arguing logically, came to be in much request. The age was also a sceptical, and therefore an investigating one. But though flourishing in Athens, sophists and their teachings were not confined to that city, but extended throughout all the Grecian republics, and occasionally to the courts of tyrants. They went about

Greece discoursing and debating, and sometimes educating the youth of rich and noble families. They were not, strictly speaking, a sect; indeed the name signifying only a wise or clever man, had been so applied from the earliest times of Greece; and Socrates, Plato, and other eminent men were all called sophists.

The disrepute attached to the name arose apparently from the facts of the teachers accepting payment for their lessons, and thence proceeding to inculcate not the desire for truth, but the means of securing victory by the use of specious fallacies. It was against both these modes that Socrates and Plato contended; and to which Plato and Aristotle affixed the name as a term of reproach for a "man who employs what he knows to be fallacy, for the purpose of deceit and of getting money." But the sophists were able to bear up against the judgment of philosophers, by having become the trainers of men for the active pursuits of life, and their influence over the multitude greatly exceeded that of the sages. Nor did they all, though they taught for money, teach fallacies merely; and the representations of

them in the Dialogues of Plato must not be accepted as the truth with reference to them as a class. Socrates, Protagoras, and Prodicus, were stigmatized as sophists, but what we know of their doctrines and practice does not deserve any heavy condemnation. No doubt, in numerous instances the sophists, like the schoolmen of the middle ages, indulged in subtleties and evasions which were dishonest, trivial, and often ridiculous; but, as Ritter says, "It is not to be denied that the sophists contributed greatly to the perfection of prose; which was in itself a great benefit to philosophy. The sophists applied themselves to manifold arts of persuasion, and in their attacks upon each other, laboring to expose and lay bare the delusions of appearance, they acquired great nicety in the distinction of terms. Prodicus was celebrated for his skill in the distinctions, of synonymous terms, as we learn from Plato, who ridicules him for it, but Prodicus is honorably mentioned by him. The sophisms turning upon the words 'to learn,' 'to understand,' 'to know,' also contributed to the more accurate knowledge of these terms. The very circumstance that their rules were

intended to be subservient to the ends of fallacy and deception, must have afforded a stronger motive to the philosophical spirit to bring under investigation the true forms of thought and expression which had been neglected by earlier philosophers; and accordingly we find that they occupied much of the attention of Socrates."

SOPHISM.

Sophism, that superficial and incomplete aspect of the truth, which at first sight looks like the truth, but on closer inspection turns out to contain some radical error. This seems the most correct definition, but the word is used loosely. Its general signification, namely, a specious proposition, is perhaps nearest the mark. Truly considered, most errors are sophisms, for errors are not direct contradictions to the truth, but simply the leaving out of view one or more elements of the truth, and seizing on only one or two elements, and declaring them to constitute the whole truth. Victor Cousin defines error to be "One ele-

ment of thought considered exclusively, and taken for the complete thought itself. Error is nothing but an incomplete truth converted into an absolute truth." Spinoza had before defined "falsity to be that privation of truth which arises from inadequate ideas." It is sometimes a mere confusion of terms; as in the common example of—Bread being better than paradise; because bread is better than nothing, and nothing is better than paradise—the confusion arises from both the "nothings" being used substantively; whereas it is only the first that is so used; the second is affirmative, and expresses "there is nothing better." A sophism is therefore the use of some word in a different sense in the premises from that in the conclusion, and this is the definition of Aristotle: "When the discourse is a demonstration of anything, if it contain anything which has no relation to the conclusion, there will be no syllogism; and if there appear to be one, it will be a sophism, and not a demonstration."

This confusion of words and ideas is the origin of all errors and sophisms; but though errors and sophisms are logically constituted

alike, yet the instinctive sense of mankind marks the difference between incomplete views (error) and wilful perversion (sophism). In all cases a sophism is supposed to be recognized as such by the sophist. It is an endeavor on his part to "make the worse appear the better reason." It is the consciousness then of the sophist which distinguishes and renders odious his error as a sophism.

SPINOZISM.

The monistic system of Baruch Despinosa (or Benedictus de Spinoza), a descendant of Portuguese Jews who had sought refuge in Holland from the cruelties of the Inquisition. He was born at Amsterdam (Nov. 24, 1632), and his father, an honorable, but not very wealthy merchant, intended him for a theological career. His education was superintended by the Talmudist Saul Levi Morteira, but unsatisfied doubts kept him from the profession of a Jewish teacher, and his determined and continued refusal to attend the Synagogue gave such offence that in 1656 he was

solemnly excommunicated. For a short time Spinoza became an assistant in a school kept by a physician named Vanden Ende, but he soon resigned this post and afterwards maintained himself by the art of polishing lenses, which, in accordance with the Jewish custom of teaching every boy some trade or handicraft, he had learnt in his youth, though this source of income was afterwards increased by a small annuity settled on him by his friend de Vries. After a life of study, abstemiousness and bodily and mental suffering, Spinoza died at the Hague (Feb. 21, 1677), at the age of forty-four. The system of Spinoza has been described as Atheism, as Pantheism, and as the most rigid Monotheism, according as his cardinal teaching—that there is only One Substance, God—has been interpreted. By Substance, however, Spinoza meant the underlying reality and ever-living existence, and he chose for the epigraph of his *Ethics* the words of St. Paul: "In Him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts XVII. 28). God is for him the one principle, having Thought and Extension as two eternal and infinite attributes constituting its essence, of which at-

tributes Mind and Matter are the necessary manifestations; and thus he solves the problem of the relation of the Finite to the Infinite. Everything is a form of the ever-living existence, the Substance, God, which is, and is not, Nature, with which He is no more to be confounded than the fountain with the rivulet or eternity with time. God is *natura naturans*, Nature is *natura naturata*; the one is the energy, the other is the act. In the same way he explains the union of the soul with the body. Man is but a mode of the Divine Existence; his mind a spark of the Divine Flame, his body a mode of the Infinite existence.

SOCRATIC-PHILOSOPHY.

A term sometimes used to include the development of Greek philosophy from the time of Socrates to the rise of the Neoplatonists, because, with the exceptions of the Epicureans, the chief philosophical schools up to that period professed to ground their teachings on the authority of Socrates.

The ethics of Socrates, as gathered from

the writings of Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle. It is not known when Socrates commenced his career as a public teacher, but he first attracted notice as an opponent of the Sophists, and was about forty-six years of age when Aristophanes introduced him on the stage in *The Clouds*, strange to say, in the character of a Sophist. All previous philosophers had been occupied with the Universe as a whole; the chief business of Socrates was with man as a moral being. His reforming tendencies made many enemies. In B. C. 399 Meletus, a leather-seller, seconded by Anytus, a poet, and Lycon, a rhetor, preferred this indictment against him: "Socrates is guilty of reviling the gods acknowledged by the State, and of preaching new gods; moreover he is guilty of corrupting the youth." He was tried and condemned to death, and, refusing the means of escape provided by his friends, drank the fatal hemlock in the seventieth year of his age. Bishop Blomfield (*Ency. Metrop.*, s. v. Socrates) says: "Socrates taught that the divine attributes might be inferred from the works of creation. He maintained the omniscience, ubiquity, and prov-

idence of the Deity; and, from the existence of conscience in the human breast, he inferred that man is a moral agent, the object of reward and punishment; and that the great distinction of virtue and vice was ordained by the Deity."

CYNICS.

Cynics, the name of a sect of Greek philosophers who were produced by the school of Socrates, and were so called according to one interpretation of the word from their snarling disposition, though it is possible that the name may have been derived from the gymnasium called Cynosarges, in which Antisthenes, the founder of this school, used to lecture. Their doctrines were the exact opposite of those of the Cyrenaics, who were also an offshoot of the Socratic philosophy. They held that virtue was not only the highest but the only object at which men ought to aim, and that most of the sciences and arts, as they do not tend to make men virtuous, but sometimes on the contrary interfere with the attainment of it,

are unprofitable and pernicious. The true philosopher, according to their notions, was he who could discard all the comforts and charities of life and triumph over his bodily wants, so as to be enabled to live only for virtue without any interruptions either to the contemplation or the practice of it. The result of these principles was great strictness of morals, and voluntary penances worthy of the fanaticism of an eastern dervise; and as long as these characteristics were coupled with ability in the professors and consistent philosophy in what they taught, the sect maintained its place by the side of other philosophical systems, and some members of it, for instance Antisthenes and Diogenes, deserved and obtained great celebrity. At length, however, the morality of the Cynics degenerated into the most shameless profligacy, and they became so disgusting from their impudence, dirty habits, and begging, that they ceased to be regarded with any respect, and the sect dwindled away into obscurity. Of their speculative opinions we know very little: indeed it does not appear that they had any theories, except on the science of logic. The great

merit of the Cynic philosophy was that it paved the way for the establishment of Stoicism, which succeeded and superseded it, just as the philosophy of Epicurus supplanted that of Aristippus. The connection of this school with the philosophy of Socrates appears to have consisted in their developing the idea of science as applied to morality (to which object the labors of Socrates were mainly directed), but they did so to the exclusion of all those other principles which Socrates admitted as useful adjuncts, and his sneers at the austerity and affected negligence of Antisthenes may be taken as a proof of the low opinion which he entertained of this narrow application of his doctrines. The classical reader will find in Lucian's "Cynicus" an attempt to justify some of the peculiar views of this school, especially in regard to their neglect of the conveniences of life, though it is not to be supposed that Lucian was inclined to the Cynical philosophy, for he elsewhere ridicules it.

CYRENAICS.

Cyrenaics, a school of philosophers among the Greeks, who derived their name from the birth-place of their founder, Aristippus. Like the Cynics, their doctrines were a partial development of those of Socrates; but the view they took of their predecessor's philosophy was quite different from the Cynical. The only particular in which the two sects agreed with the original system and with one another was that they all three made virtue consist in knowledge; in other words they were all three attempts to awaken and develop the idea of science; but while the Cynics considered all sublunary enjoyment and most branches of knowledge as impediments to the knowledge, and consequently, according to Socrates, to the practice, of virtue, the Cyrenaics, on the other hand, were not contented with the mere knowledge of the good as a general term, but sought for it in the separate particulars, and deemed him to have performed his proper functions most consistently

with his nature who had succeeded in amassing the greatest number of particular good things. In regard to the idea of science, they did not look upon it as a speculative conception, but as a merely empirical result, as the aggregation of successive experiences; in other words, not as an intuition but as a combination of perceptions; and while Plato, and in some measure the Cynics also, placed the summum bonum in the attainment, by means of dialectics, of the abstract idea of the good, the Cyrenaics placed it in the collection of the greatest number of agreeable perceptions, and the true philosopher, according to them, was one who actively, methodically, and successfully carried on the pursuit of pleasure. Consequently, as agreeable perceptions were continually to be sought as good and the contrary to be avoided as bad in themselves, perceptions of sensible objects became the criterion of all knowledge and the object of all action, and therefore truth both theoretical and practical. The chief successors of Aristippus were Theodorus, Hegesias, and Anniceris. Theodorus perceived the necessity for some principle, in addition to the mere col-

lection of agreeable sensations; for without some effort of the understanding to determine which of many gratifications was to be preferred, it would be impossible, he thought, to obtain the maximum of gratification; and he therefore set understanding over the senses as a regulating and restraining faculty. He is said to have been banished from Athens for denying the existence of the gods. Hegesias, following in the steps of Theodorus, insisted still more than he did upon the inadequacy of the senses as the criteria of the desirable, and at last even went so far as to assert that nothing was in itself either agreeable or the contrary, and that life and everything in life should be a matter of indifference to the wise man. In this assertion of the principle of indifference he made an approach to the doctrines of Epicurus and the Stoics in the point in which these two opposite systems met. Cicero tells us that his book caused so many suicides that he was forbidden by one of the Ptolemies to lecture on the worthlessness of life. In the philosophy of Anniceris and his followers the original principles of the Cyrenaics were quite lost, and though he also, in a

popular way recommended the pursuit of the agreeable, he denied that it depended in any way upon mere sensible impressions, for that the wise man might be happy in spite of all annoyances; that friendship was to be sought, not for the sake of any immediate advantage to be derived from it, but on account of the good-will which it generated; and that for a friend's sake a man should encounter even annoyances and troubles. These are the doctrines of a mere popular morality, and can hardly be ascribed to one school more than to any other. It will be remarked by every one that the original tenets of this school were very similar to those of Epicurus; indeed, with the exception of the atomic system which he borrowed from Democritus and Leucippus, the two systems differed only in this: the Cyrenaics placed the great object of man in the positive and active pursuit of the agreeable, while Epicurus made it consist in a perfect rest of mind and in freedom from pain; for he considered the agreeable as something merely negative, as the pleasing harmony produced by exemption from all passion and appetite. The philosophy of Epicurus may

therefore be considered as the successor, in one point of view, of the system of Aristippus.

WORSHIP.

Whether any savage tribes exist with no belief in any being higher than man, is doubtful. Burton and Sir John Lubbock are of opinion, as was Mr. Darwin, that there have been, and still are such tribes; Dr. Tylor, after explaining away some alleged cases, expresses doubt of those remaining. Lubbock thus arranges the first great stages in religious thought: Atheism, understanding by this term, not a denial of the existence of a Deity, but an absence of any definite ideas on the subject. Fetichism, the stage in which man supposes he can force the Deity to comply with his desires. Nature-worship or Totemism, in which natural objects, trees, lakes, stones, animals, &c., are worshipped. Shamanism, in which the superior deities are far more powerful than man, and of a different nature. Their place of abode also is far away,

and accessible only to Shamans. Idolatry or Anthropomorphism, in which the gods take still more completely the nature of men, being, however, more powerful. They are still amenable to persuasion; they are a part of nature, and not creatures. They are represented by images or idols. In the next stage, the Deity is regarded as the author, not merely a part of nature. He becomes for the first time a really supernatural being. The last stage is that in which morality is associated with religion.

FATALISM.

This term is used to express an article of philosophical religion, and usually signifies that the successive actions of mankind, and even the successive operations of the powers of nature, are under the guidance of some superior almighty power, so that these successions and the actions themselves are entirely independent of each other. This doctrine has been embodied in all religious systems, though very different names have been given

to the governing power. The Greeks called it moira or ananke, and the Romans called it fate; their mythology also mentions a Demiurgus, who had formed the gods. All the ancient religions of Asia recognize a similar fate, something mightier than the gods, to whom it dictates laws; such, for example, as the alternating governments of Ormuzd and Ahrimanes in the Persian mythology, &c. Among the Hebrews the Pharisees were fatalists, the Sadducees materialists, and the Essenes deists. The old Germanic religion of Odin modified this fate, and brought it nearer to the idea of the government of the world by a deity, identifying it with their highest god, whose name was not to be pronounced. From this point fate changes to what is called predestination (in opposition to chance), which idea is only a mitigated fate, distinguished, however, from genuine fatalism in proceeding directly from God, and not from fate. This belief in predestination was taught by Mohammed, and his followers have retained it. Roman Catholicism has no trace of this doctrine, but it is held by the Calvinists, and to a certain extent at least by the church of England.

The doctrine of fatalism, as is well known, has been frequently and effectively used by both ancient and modern poets.

Intimately related to fatalism is the doctrine of the immediate and direct intervention of Providence in the government of the world. According to this doctrine the consequences of the actions of mankind depend wholly upon the actions themselves; God, however, is able so to conduct these consequences, that collectively they shall result in good, and conformably to His purpose. To comprehend this working precisely is impossible for man, since his mental powers are not sufficiently extensive, and this dogma must therefore be a matter of faith. This doctrine is held by many Christian sects, and in the Bible there are passages strongly in favor of such special intervention; for example, Matthew X. 29, "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father."

The third or deistical interpretation of this doctrine teaches the complete non-intervention of the Deity in the affairs of the world or of mankind: we may also call this doctrine the

doctrine of theological chance, which may still be consistent with that of physical necessity, according to Kant. The doctrine of physical necessity was advocated by Hobbes, and served for the foundation of the charges against him of deism and atheism.

If we consider these doctrines in a philosophical point of view we may come to the following results:—The theological theories of fatalism, predestination, the immediate government of God, and his non-intervention, evidently bear an analogical relation to the political systems of despotism, constitutional monarchy, and republicanism. Accordingly as every one may have grounds for being an adherent of one of these political systems, so may he also have grounds for being a follower of one of these theological views. According to the ideas and investigations of the author of this article, God may have positively fixed, before any creation of the world, the eternal ideas, or the relation of things to each other within the circle of which nature and human intelligence have to move. These ideas are (1) for nature, self-preservation, or continuance, of which the product is attrac-

tion, &c.; regularity, producing crystallization, &c.; and adaptation to purposes, producing organization, &c.; (2) for human intelligence, self-love, beauty, and virtue. In so far as nature and humanity with all their efforts cannot move out of this sphere of ideas, so far fatalism and predestination exist. The efforts of nature to adapt means to ends, and the endeavors of the wise after virtue (or human happiness) appear to produce an ever increasing progression, and in this sense they constitute an intervention of Providence—since nature being wholly bound, and God absolutely uncontrolled, man stands between both; so that though he is not absolutely free, yet he is free to work his ultimate ends out of himself; he is free whenever he acts morally, and he is not free whenever he acts immorally (or rather physically), and he may thus arrive at the consciousness that his state in another world entirely depends on himself. With this conviction every species of intervention would appear less harsh towards him, and without these grounds he may be doubtful whether any direct intervention exists with respect to worldly affairs.

NECESSITY.

Necessity, according to the common definition is that quality of a thing by which it cannot but be, or whereby it cannot be otherwise. When, in a proposition which affirms any thing to be true, there is a fixed invariable connection between the subject and the predicate, then that thing is understood to be necessary. Necessity is opposed to chance, accident, contingency, and to whatever involves the idea of uncertainty and of possible variation. It is usually distinguished into logical, physical and moral necessity. Logical necessity consists in the circumstance that the conception of something being different from what it is, implies a contradiction or absurdity. In this sense it is necessary that two and two should be four, that converging lines, if produced far enough, should meet; thus also the eternal existence of being generally is necessary, as are innumerable other truths. Physical necessity has its origin in the established order and laws of the material universe. The

necessity, in this case, differs from that formerly specified, in that it is only conditional, is a necessity of consequence. Everything that takes place in the natural world happens by virtue of certain laws: these laws are known by experience to operate regularly and uniformly; and the results of their operation are hence, with reference to them, said to be necessary. When we ascribe anything to chance, we merely state our ignorance of the law or laws to which its existence is to be referred. Physical necessity is founded on the relation of cause and effect. By tracing back this connection, we arrive at the knowledge of a great first cause, that is God, who is the only Being existing independently and by an absolute necessity. His infinity and other attributes are necessary; and it is evident that the purposes and acts of such a Being must also be necessary, being determined by that necessity by which he is what he is. He must always resolve and act with the most perfect wisdom, justice and goodness. To affirm the contrary would be to affirm that he is different from what he is. Moral necessity has reference to the volitions and actions of rational

agents, and is intended to express the connection between these volitions and actions, and certain moral causes, as inclinations, desires, or motives generally. Whether there be any connection which, strictly speaking, may be termed necessary, between such motives, and the resolutions of the human will, and the consequent actions, or whether, independent of them, the will has a self-determining power, is an inquiry which has largely engaged the attention of both philosophers and theologians. It is one of great interest, and which has an important bearing, on whatever relates to man as the subject of a moral government.

The doctrine of a universal necessity, or fatalism, was maintained by many of the ancient philosophers; and formed the characteristic tenet of the Stoical school. According to it, necessity was to be considered as an inevitable and all comprehending principle, to which gods as well as men were subject. Everything was conceived to exist in a necessary series of causes and effects—the whole constitution of nature—the modes and circumstances of all things without exception—being irresistibly and unchangeably determined. Hence the

language of Seneca, the elegant expounder of the opinions of this sect, in his treatise "On Providence:"—"The same necessity binds both gods and men—Divine as well as human affairs proceed onward in an irresistible stream—one cause depends upon another—effects are produced in an endless series—nothing is the offspring of chance." Democritus held opinions closely resembling the Stoical doctrine of fate; as also Heraclitus, the founder of the sect that went by his name. In modern times, the doctrine of necessity, especially in regard to the human will, has been defended by Hobbes, Leibnitz, Priestley, Hume, Kaimes, Hartley, and many others.

FREE WILL.

The universal language and practice of mankind imply a belief in a kind of free-will. To deliberate, to choose, to determine, and to act in pursuance of such determination, are expressions in every man's mouth, and things within every man's ordinary experience, both

of himself and others. Every man also supposes that another will choose and determine pretty much in the same way that he himself would under the same external circumstances; that is, each man believes that every other man will be governed by motives, or will act according to motives, in the main pretty much as he would himself. When men act differently under the same external circumstances, the cause of the difference in conduct is not referred to the circumstances, in which it is here supposed that there is no difference, but to some difference in the persons. We believe, therefore, that circumstances move men to act, but that we have at least a certain power of weighing these various motives and giving the preponderance to one or another, and that different men possess and exercise this power in different degrees. This may be called, in a sense, a free exercise of the will, and every man, at least who is of sound mind, believes that he has this power, and is supposed by others to have it.

The belief that man possesses this power is the foundation of laws which forbid acts under certain penalties. All legislators have be-

lieved that the knowledge that a certain punishment will follow a certain act if detected, operates in some degree on those who are disposed to do the forbidden act; that the persons who are by any motives led towards such act may, and as a general rule will, deliberate on the penalty attached to the act before they do it, and will often be prevented from doing it by a comparison of the advantage which they expect to derive from the act, with the certain penalty attached to it. Many persons do not violate the law because they have been brought up in habits of uniform obedience to it, and therefore the penalties of the law have little or no effect upon their conduct; but it will hardly be disputed that the fear of punishment has some effect on many men, and is a motive which, operating on the mind and operated upon by the mind, produces self-restraint. The enactment of penal laws supposes a power in men to determine how they will act; or, in other words, it supposes at least that motives can be presented to men which shall in some way and in some degree determine their conduct.

That men, then, do act under the influence

of motives, and that they have also the power of weighing motives, is universally admitted, and for all practical purposes it is immaterial to inquire any further. A man subjects himself to a certain discipline, he educates his children in a certain method, and legislators forbid men to do a variety of acts,—all acting under the belief that the discipline, the education, and the rules of law are so many motives, which, by constantly operating on the mind, will produce on the whole a certain line of conduct in those who are the objects of them.

But it has been already said, that the external circumstances or the motives being the same, two persons will often act differently under them. As the external motives are by the supposition the same, there is some difference in the persons which causes the difference of conduct. Under the same external circumstances, one man will violate the law, and another will not; one will steal and rob, and commit murder, and another will not. It is generally said that the transgressor of the law is punished on the supposition that his act is voluntary; that he could, if he chose,

have acted differently. Practically, he who executes the law will not trouble himself with the question whether a particular individual could have acted differently under the circumstances: if it is shown that such a person possessed the ordinary understanding of mankind, he will see no reason for remitting the punishment; because he believes that in most cases, if not in all, the penalty attached to a particular act will operate to deter people from doing it. The question of an absolute free-will, then, does not concern a legislator. It is enough for him to present the proper motives for acting or not acting in certain ways, if he believes that such motives will on the whole produce the conduct which he requires. Nor does the question of absolute free-will concern any other person who has to direct or operate upon others. If he believes that he can place such circumstances around persons, or present to them such motives, as will cause a determinate course of action, it is unimportant whether he believes that the course of action is necessarily determined by these circumstances, or by these concurring with other circumstances, or that the persons who

are under their influence do in some way or other choose and determine to act as he wishes them to act.

But if we examine more closely any particular act of a man's life, suppose it to be an act which has about it all the marks of slow deliberation, in what sense can we say that this is an act of absolute free-will? The ordinary language of mankind assumes the existence of choice,—deliberation,—and yet it does not permit us to maintain that every act is an act of absolute free-will. If it is a virtuous act, we do not barely ascribe it to a man's careful consideration of all the motives which at the time operated on him; we speak of his habits, his education, his character, as the things which would ensure his acting on a given occasion in a determinate way, or, if we so choose to express it, as securing that exercise of the will which is called a proper exercise. And we make the like remarks of a man who has deliberately done a bad act. In both cases we do not attribute the whole conduct of the man, nor yet the greater part of it, to his then determination. We refer to antecedent circumstances as co-operating to this

determination. This is the language of all mankind; and the language of all mankind, when rightly analyzed, is the true exponent of universal opinion. Confused and perplexed as it often is, it contains within it implicitly the elements of all philosophy. Now, when we once refer to antecedent circumstances as affecting our détermination under the motives that are presented on any one occasion, we give up the theory of an absolute free-will, for we make every act of will depend, in some degree at least, on something prior; and that something, again, must by the like reasoning depend on something prior to it; and thus we have an infinite chain of events, and consequently we find ourselves engaged in an inquiry which is beyond the reach of our capacity. Thus, if, as Hartley says, "by free-will be meant a power of beginning motion," no person can, consistently with his own ordinary language and that of others, maintain this proposition; if he does, he will contradict himself almost as often as he speaks.

Human actions, then, are, in some degree at least, subject to the same general laws to which other events are subject. Every hu-

man action has its antecedents, on which it in some degree depends; but whether every human action is as necessary, in the sense in which Hume explains the term necessary, as the other phenomena which we see, is precisely the matter in dispute. (Hume, Essays, "Of Liberty and Necessity.")

When it is said that every event and every human action has its antecedent on which it depends, it must not be understood that it is meant, here at least, to maintain anything else than this. Such antecedents are events which, according to our experience precede the given event uniformly, or at least with sufficient uniformity to generate in our minds the notion of a certain order or continuity; for though any given antecedent event is called the cause of any event which uniformly follows it in our ordinary mode of speech, we here mean to express nothing more than the fact of this uniform sequence. The utmost that we can say is, that the antecedent event is, according to the constitution of the universe as known to us, a necessary condition to the subsequent event. Neither heat, nor moisture, nor anything else

that we can name, is the cause or a cause of a seed vegetating and producing a plant like that from which it came. Heat and other things are conditions of vegetation as known to us. The efficient cause can only be one, which must be perpetual, and beyond which we seek for no other. This efficient cause is no law of nature, a term which is incapable of all strict analysis. It is the will of God to those who admit the existence and omnipotence of the Deity. To those who do not, if there be such, it is something which has never yet been explained.

Now all human actions have their antecedents, without which, according to our experience, they could not be, it follows that there are certain antecedents of every action which are its conditions, without which such action would never be. This cannot be denied. It is the ordinary language of mankind expressed in a different form. But still it is perfectly consistent with this to speak of man exercising his will, that is, operating on the motives which are presented to him. On any given occasion man is subjected to various momenta, and it may be admitted that each

man will be directed by that which to him at the time is the strongest. But if a power of estimating different motives be admitted to exist in the mind, and to exist in different men in different degrees, the strength of the motive is not its own strength acting on the passive mind; it is the activity of the mind which according to its power comprehends the motive completely or incompletely.

If the analogy is sound between human actions and other phenomena, and if in other phenomena the antecedents or conditions are not causes, so neither are the antecedents or conditions of human actions to be viewed as their causes. Man is constantly subjected to various momenta, motives, or circumstances, as they are often called, without which he would not act as he does act. These momenta are traced back by an infinite series to the first cause of all, just as in the bare physical phenomena, if we trace them far enough, we must ascend to a first cause. If the analogy then is complete between man's acts and other phenomena, the operation of all these complicated conditions in some way determines the acts of man; but how it determines them we

cannot tell. There is no person who maintains the doctrine of absolute free-will who will contend that man can set his will in opposition to that of God. It is possible to conceive that God does will to let man have free action within certain limits, but not further; and all our forms of speech do either expressly or by implication admit that our will is free to a certain extent, which we cannot exactly define, but that it is not absolutely free. It may be objected that to deny an absolute free-will destroys the distinction between actions; that it represents the Deity as the cause of vice and misery. But even if it should be so, that will not prove a thing to be false which is established by the sound exercise of our understanding. No such consequence, however, does follow. To God we attribute the origin of everything; and consistently with this we must say that he permits vice and misery to exist in the world. It is a consequence of man's nature as he is constituted, and under the circumstances in which he is placed, that he has acted and does act in such a way as to cause misery to himself and others.

It must therefore be assumed that man is

so constituted that he does not always act in the way that is most consistent with his own happiness and the happiness of others. The vicious conduct of many men in life is an object of disapprobation to others, and in all societies that conduct which is injurious to the existence of such societies is visited with penalties. Thus a vast majority of mankind see that certain acts are injurious to the general happiness, and it is one main object of society to prevent such acts. As God permits society to exist, we may assume that he wills it to exist, and that he wills generally the means by which society attempts to secure its own existence. It is a consequence of this that he disapproves of the conduct of those whose acts endanger the existence of society. We cannot say that he does not will it: it exists, and therefore is consistent with his general will. We are compelled therefore to apply to him by analogy such terms as are applicable only to our own limited capacities: and we say that he wills generally that all things shall be as they are, but that he disapproves of some. That he permits man so much liberty of action as to render it neces-

sary for society to be vigilant against the evil doers who would disturb its repose, is no more an imputation upon his goodness than that he permits fire, tempest, and war and pestilence and famine to thin the numbers of mankind. So far as concerns those who suffer, it is the same thing whether they suffer from the hand of man, or from causes over which he has no control. It is consistent with all experience to say the Deity has willed that man shall suffer pain both through the agency of matter and through the agency of his fellow-men. Now if we shall assume that God only wills our happiness in the sense in which many persons understand it—which would, according to their notions, exclude all pain and suffering—whatever misery happens through man's misconduct must be against his general will, and can only result from man having an absolute free-will, and sometimes exercising it in a way different from the Deity's wishes. There is no evading this difficulty. An absolute free-will in man or in any other being is inconsistent with the omnipotence of the Deity, and it is, as already shown, contradicted by all our observation of the mode in which man is oper-

ated upon by motives and circumstances. But there is nothing which prevents us from attributing to man, as we do in our daily expressions, a power of determining his acts, under given circumstances, in one direction rather than in another, and in a wrong in preference to a right direction. And it is further admitted by the universal language of mankind, that the same man who acted wrong under one set of motives, might and would have acted right if he had been influenced by other motives; and these motives to right action, it is also admitted, may be and frequently are external circumstances over which he has no control. It is true that a man may so discipline himself, that, in any given circumstances which may arise, he may have motives at his command which shall enable him to act in the right direction. But if some men can do this, all cannot; and even in the case of him who can do it, we may always trace the origin of this power to some external circumstances over which he had no control. Man's will then is circumscribed by the constitution of things, of which he is a part. He is placed in circumstances in which he is operated upon

by various motives to action. If it is said that he must be determined absolutely by that which is the most powerful, this is only another mode of saying that of various forces tending to make him move, the strongest will carry him in its own direction. But in truth the words force, motive, and others of a like kind, are apt to lead us to false analogies: and these terms require explanation.

Every man believes at the time when he acts with deliberation that he has a capacity for exercising a free-will. But he also knows that circumstances may prevent deliberation. Thus it is a common case for a man to allege that if he had not been alarmed or hurried, he would have acted differently; or in other words, he would have been enabled to deliberate and decide better. No man considers it to be a case where the will is properly concerned when his action is thus impeded. And there are numerous like cases in life in which in fact there is no choice or deliberation, and consequently no real exercise of the will. The power, then, whatever it may be, to deliberate and act, is often suspended or not exercised. In most cases we act from habit in the gen-

eral course of life, in other cases from impulse; and when we act from impulse, there is no deliberation or determinate will. It appears then that our will is not always exercised when we act, but that when it is exercised we are conscious of a capacity to weigh deliberately the various motives or grounds of action as presented by our own mental activity. Now if we say that the strongest motive thus presented must prevail and determine to action, we may, as above observed, be misled by a false analogy. The motive may be called a moving power; and if so, it must have its effect: but to deny the mind all power in itself to resist the motive, is the same thing as to consider it an inert mass operated upon solely by an external force. It is the same thing as to make the mind of man a recipient of sensuous phenomena without any power to operate on them. The systems of philosophy which view the mind as such a recipient will be consistent in making it yield to the strongest motive without an effort of its own. Those systems which assign to the mind a power of operating on impressions may consistently admit a power of determining which of them it will obey.

IDEAL.

Ideal has two uses, philosophical and critical. In the former it signifies, first, whatever belongs or relates to ideas generally. It is in this sense that the word is employed in the phrase "Ideal theory," in the controversy between Reid and Priestley. According to this theory, the understanding does not perceive external objects themselves by means of the sensuous organs, but the organs of sight and touch transmit to the mind certain ideas or images of sensible objects, which it perceives within itself. Locke, who received the term idea from Descartes, seems unconsciously to have adopted, with the use of the word, the scholastic doctrine which it involved. For he expressly declares that our ideas of the primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, but that those produced by secondary qualities are no resemblances at all. From this explanation of the means of perception, Locke has, on the one hand, been represented as the origin of modern idealism; while on the

other, in consequence of the superior value which he evidently gives to the testimony of sensation, his authority has been claimed by the opposite school of ideology, as founded by the disciples of his French commentator Condillac. The second sense of the word is more limited, being confined to a peculiar class of ideas created by and solely subsisting in the imagination. Connected with this especial signification in its usage in the science of criticism, or aesthetics. Here ideal signifies a something which, although not existing in the reality of sensible things, subsists actually in thought—the joint creation of the reason and the imagination, the archetype and pattern of supreme and perfect beauty. Although unreal in nature, this ideal is not unnatural; it is the absolute sum and unity of those scattered beauties which nature, with a lavish but impartial hand, has diffused among her myriad phenomena.

IDEALISM.

Idealism, the designation of many and different systems of philosophy, which only agree in the common principle from which they originate. This principle is the opposition of the ideal and the real, that is, of ideas and things—the contrariety of mind and body, or of spirit and matter.

1. As the essence of the mental lies in free activity and vital motion, as opposed to the invariable mechanism and inertness of the corporeal, the name of Idealism is rightly applied to those systems of physiology which make the primal substance and original of all things to be certain forces invisibly working throughout the universe. To the idealists of this class belong the dynamical philosophers of the Ionian school, Thales, Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Heraclitus.

The fundamental position of their several doctrines was the assumption of a living energy which as it develops itself undergoes continuous alteration both of form and quality

—a transmutation which is the cause of all generation in nature. For water, the primary substance of Thales, was not the simple element, but water pregnant with vitality; the infinite air of Anaximenes was an animated and animating energy; and the intellectual primary of Diogenes was not merely the atmospheric air, but a warm and perfect breath of life which pervades and ensouls the universe. While, however, in these philosophers the philosophical idea is more or less mixed up with divers sensible conceptions, Heraclitus seems clearly conscious of speaking figuratively of the primary substance. With him a universal and absolute life is the cause of all phenomena, which indeed is most strongly and openly manifested in the vitality of fire and the rational soul, which is like to fire, while in other phenomena it is inherent, although not so obvious and immediately cognizable. In this class of idealists among moderns we must reckon Boscovich and Leibnitz. The former explained matter to be a system of forces; while, according to the latter, all beings are of the same nature. Activity and simplicity are the essential characters of all, and

are so many forces or causes which he terms monads. All these monads possess the faculty of perception, or of reflecting within themselves, as in a mirror, the universe. These images, however, of perception cannot become the objects of knowledge, unless in these monads, which possess also what Leibnitz calls apperception, by which they are enabled to distinguish and see in themselves these images. It is therefore this faculty of apperception which constitutes the difference between the so-called material and spiritual; and as the faculty itself admits of different degrees, there are corresponding orders of intelligences. Lastly, we must include in this class, if anywhere among the idealists, the system of Spinoza, who asserts the identity of matter and spirit, making them to be but different aspects of one and the same substance; and Schelling, whose philosophy may be regarded as the complement of that of the Jewish philosopher.

2. Another species of idealism considers the real as simply ideal, and assumes that our representations of a material world correspond to nothing actually existing, but that by contem-

plating these as objective, we transmute the merely ideal into the real. The fundamental axiom of this idealism is the priority of the ideal and the subsequence of the real ("ideale prius, reale posterius"). Accordingly, the real only exists so far as it is necessarily conceived by us, so that the external world is purely a creation of our conceptions, or, in other words, the real is a product of the ideal. To this class is referred the Platonic attempt to account for the existence of the sensible world by his ideas alone, without recourse to any other nature alien and foreign to them. By some, even the Aristotelian philosophy is designated as ideal in this sense, at least so far as regards its fundamental principle. This they make to be the assumption of a universal mundane intelligence which, as the principle of all things is a force, self-active, all-perfect, and absolutely free. The manifold manifestations of this entelechy are forms before and beside which matter exists only potentially, while the forms are determined and distinguished by privation. But the most perfect of idealists in this class is Fichte, who derives not merely the form, but also the mat-

ter, of the conception of external things out of the mind itself, or, in his terminology, out of the ego.

3. A third system of idealism proceeds to the absolute denial of all material existences. This species of idealism was impossible among the ancients, who did not oppose mind so sharply to matter as to deny the possibility of their interaction, but tacitly supposed their similarity, opposing only corporeity, as composite, to incorporeity, as simple. Of this idealism Bishop Berkeley is the author, although Descartes gave occasion to it by his position, that nothing extended can enter the unextended soul. Arthur Collier maintained the same theory, by a different line of argument, and Locke afforded, by his doctrine of ideas, the arguments for its support. The system of Berkeley is briefly this: matter does not exist independently of our sensations, but conceptions of a material world are produced by the operation of the Deity upon our understanding, and the material world exists only in the divine intellect, who awakes in us certain sensuous conceptions in a definite order,

which order is what we call the course of nature.

4. The last species of idealism is more philosophical, and, without denying or asserting the existence of a material world, is content with confessing an ignorance of its nature. It pretends not to a knowledge of things themselves, but is content with employing the ideas which the mind forms, according to the laws of its own nature, upon the occasion of the excitement of its sensuous organs, without determining whether these ideas correspond or not to the exciting cause or causes, whatever they may be. To this class belong Malebranche and Kant. According to the former, mind and matter cannot act upon each other, and the sensations of the mind are so many occasional causes operating by a constant miracle of divine agency. According to the latter, all that we know of outward objects is that they furnish the material part of our conceptions, to which the mind furnishes the form agreeably to its original and connatural laws; while of things themselves, which he calls phenomena, we absolutely know nothing, but

note only the modes under which they appear to us.

Idealism in fact forms the antithesis to realism, which involves materialism. Sir William Hamilton in his "Lectures on Metaphysics" says—"a philosophical system is often prevented from falling into absolute idealism or absolute materialism, and held in a kind of oscillating equilibrium, not in consequence of being based on the fact of consciousness, but from the circumstance that its materialistic tendency in one opinion happens to be counteracted by its idealistic tendency in another; two opposite errors in short, co-operating to the same result as one truth. On this ground is to be explained why the philosophy of Locke and Condillac did not more easily slide into materialism." (Lecture xvi.) He also observes that "mankind in general believe that an external world exists, only because they believe that they immediately know it as existent." But of course if this knowledge be disallowed, if the perception be only existent in the mind, the conclusion would be unfounded.

OPTIMISM.

The name given to the view propounded in the Theodicee of Leibnitz that this world, as the work of God, must be the best among all possible worlds; for, were a better world possible than that which actually exists, God's wisdom must have known, His goodness must have willed, and His omnipotence must have created it. Leibnitz maintained that, if there was to be a world, it must consist of finite beings; this is the justification of finiteness and liability to suffering, or metaphysical evil; that physical evil, or pain, is salutary as punishment, or means of tuition; and that God could not remove moral evil, or wrong, without removing the power of self-determination, and, therewith, the possibility of morality itself. J. S. Mill (Three Essays upon Religion, p. 40) points out that Leibnitz did not maintain that this is the best of all conceivable, but of all possible, worlds, so that his doctrine (though not that of his caricature, Pangloss) might be held by a "limited" Theist.

UTILITARIANISM.

A word coined by J. Stuart Mill to denote that system which makes the happiness of mankind the criterion of right. It is thus more extensive than Epicureanism, which constituted personal happiness a criterion for the individual, leaving the happiness of others out of the question. The system owes its origin to Bentham (1748-1832), was attacked by Macaulay in the *Edinburgh Review*, and is thus defined by J. S. Mill: "The creed which accepts, as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory much more requires to be said; in particular what things it includes in the ideas of pain or pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open

question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded—namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.”

NIHILISM.

A term used in Western Europe to designate the Russian Socialist movement, which began about 1870, and may be divided into two distinct periods: (1) “The going among the peasants.” A number of young men and young women of the upper classes voluntarily went to work in the fields and the factories so as personally to carry on a Socialist propaganda and distribute Socialist literature. Their organs were the *Yperiod* (Forward!) of London and the *Workman* of Geneva. This lasted about six years, during which time

there were twenty-three political trials of 417 persons, half of whom were condemned to exile in Siberia or to hard labor in the mines. (2) In 1878 the struggle with the government commenced. At a congress held at Lipetz, shortly after Solovieff's attempt on the life of Alexander II., the acquisition of political freedom was declared to be the first necessity. It was hoped to gain this by the formation of a legislative body, elected by the people, with guarantees for electoral independence, and liberty to agitate for reforms. This was demanded from Alexander III. shortly after the assassination of the late Emperor as the price of cessation from violence. The Nihilist programme is an agrarian socialism based on communal property. The discoveries of the police show that Nihilism is widely spread in Russia, not only among the working, but among the well-to-do classes, and even in the army, especially in Petersburg, and in many of the principal cities and towns.

SOCIALISM.


The word Socialism is employed in several different senses. Loosely, it includes all schemes for abolishing social inequality, and in this sense it is generally distinguished as Utopian Socialism, under which designation communities like those of the Essenes, the early Christians, and the Shakers in America at the present day, and the ideal commonwealths of Plato, More, and Harrington, are to be classed. St. Simon (1760-1825), Owen (1771-1858), and Fourier (1768-1830) were the leading modern Utopians. Scientific Socialism is an economic theory which affirms that the materials from which labor produces wealth—i. e., the land—should be the property of the community, not of the individuals forming a separate class. Socialists also demand that the existing capital, having (as they contend) been unjustly appropriated by the landholding class or its assignees, be restored, with the land, to the community. It vests all authority in the hands of delegates elected by the community, and seeks to substitute public co-operation for private enterprise in supplying all social needs.

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